

INTEGRATIVE EXPLORATIONS

Journal of Culture and Consciousness

The Journal of the Jean Gebser Society

December 1998/Volume 5 Number 1



Poems: Songlines

Poem: Onion Skin

The Battle of Magic Against Myth
in American Elections

Identity and Memory on Both Sides
of Claude/Hosanna's Body

Quest for Altruism

Blood, Death and the End of the Old Order:
The Mystery Religion as a Vehicle for
Consciousness Transition

Gebser Reprogrammed: Suppose
An Emerging Cyber Consciousness

On Communication Competence

Education in Latin America:
Overlapping Structures of Consciousness

Terry Hauptman

Roger Cook

Joseph F. Freeman

Rosanna Vitale

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William Miller

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Bienvenido Argueta Hernandez

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Journal of Culture and Consciousness

March 1998/Volume 5 Number 1

http://www.govst.edu/ie_journal

Integrative Explorations is the official journal of the Jean Gebser Society. The journal is edited in cooperation with Division of Liberal Arts—Communications Program, Governors State University. The journal publishes integrative explorations in the form of articles, bibliographies, or reviews of research about culture/civilization, consciousness, or Jean Gebser's life and thought; as well as, poetry, short essays, etc. Submissions should loosely conform to discussions of culture/civilization and consciousness, be scholarly and footnoted. The journal seeks interdisciplinary work and is open to creative and "alternative" styles of investigation. See below for submission policy.

The Cover was inspired by a cosmic "sun" and "starfield" used on the cover of one of Jean Gebser's publications.

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The *Integrative Explorations Journal* (ISSN 1074–3618) will be published biannually in January and June (our goal), will be continuously paginated, and consist of articles up to 20 pages (longer manuscripts will be considered), single-spaced, and include a forum for discussion of issues, poetry, commentary, and book reviews. Articles will be blind, peer reviewed by at least two members of the editorial board (papers should have the authors name and affiliation only on the first page so it may be removed for the blind/anonymous review process). No paper can be under consideration for publication in any other journal at the time of submission. The MLA style manual will be the basic guideline for submissions (APA style will also be accepted). These guidelines include the use of gender-inclusive language. Three copies of a work must be submitted for review with a 150–200 word abstract prior to the opening paragraphs of the paper, brief (100 words or so) biographical summary of author(s), and a list of key words for use in indexing. Unless otherwise stated, articles may be published on the Gebser Website for viewing and downloading.

Advertising: The journal will accept advertising. Inquiries should be directed to the managing editor.

Subscriptions: Subscription is included with membership in the Jean Gebser Society (\$30.00/year, \$20.00 student) which includes participation at the annual conference of the society. Individual issues of the *Integrative Explorations Journal* can be had for \$7.00 for a printed copy and \$5.00 for a digital copy on 3.5” disk or via email attachment, (please specify word processor or text viewer). Eventually, we expect to have the journal available on the Internet. Make checks payable to GSU/Jean Gebser Society. c/o Michael Purdy, Managing Editor, *Integrative Explorations Journal* and send to above address.

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About Integrative Explorations Journal

Integrative Explorations Journal is the result of thirteen years of publication as the Gebser Network Newsletter. The newsletter and the journal are the result of the efforts of Algis Mickunas to spread the word about the works of Jean Gebser. The Gebser Network Newsletter was begun in 1980 by Elaine McCoy then a graduate student in the School of Interpersonal Communication at Ohio University. In 1983 Michael Purdy took over the editorship of the newsletter and published the newsletter from Governors State University.

The newsletter was originally developed to be an information sharing instrument for the Jean Gebser Society. The Gebser Society is patterned after European societies, or circles, pursuing the work of a particular philosopher. The philosopher here, Jean Gebser, was born in Posen, Germany in 1905 and died May 4, 1973. He studied and worked in Germany until the rise of the Nazi party in 1931. From Germany he fled to Spain where he wrote poetry (*Poesias de al Tarde*, 1936) and served in the Republican Ministry of Culture. When war over took the country in 1936 he fled to Paris where he associated with the circle of artists surrounding Picasso and Malraux. He finally fled Paris as the city fell in 1939 and went to Switzerland. He became a Swiss citizen in 1951 and he assumed the chair for the Study of Comparative Civilizations at the University of Salzburg.

It was in Switzerland that Gebser finished his monumental work on the comparative study of civilizations, *Ursprung und Gegenwart* (1949/53). The English translation was undertaken by Noel Barstad with Algis Mickunas and published as *The Ever Present Origin* in 1985 by Ohio University Press. This massive effort of over 500 pages is a phenomenology of civilization. From a vast collection of work covering many fields, historical and current, Gebser described the modalities of consciousness of historical cultures, as well as the extent and openness of human consciousness in general. His work is penetrating and offers an understanding useful to scholars from many fields of study.

Those wishing to pursue the study of Jean Gebser's work must read *Origin and Presence*, still published by Ohio University Press. This work is very accessible and eminently readable. Some of the authors represented in *Integrative Explorations* have published more extensive works on Gebser and provide an excellent basis for study of Gebser (e.g., see G. Feuerstein, *Structures of Consciousness*, Lower Lake, CA: Integral Publishing, 1995; also, A. combs, *The Radiance of Being*, St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 1996). Back issues of the Gebser Network Newsletter also contain information about the Jean Gebser Society, short articles, poetry, translations of short works by Gebser, excerpts from longer works, poems of Gebser's with commentary, and reviews of books about Gebser's work. (All of the back issues of the Gebser Network Newsletter may be obtained from the editor on a PC compatible disk for a fee of \$5.00.)*

Editor's Word

Michael Purdy

Another journal completed. The stone is at the top of the grade, soon to roll back down the incline ready for the next effort. I thought this would be the year we would publish two issues of the journal; however, not only did the production schedule and submissions not cooperate, but it turned out there weren't enough funds anyway to support a second issue. So perhaps next year.

I want to personally thank all of the members of the Jean Gebser Society whose contributions made this issue possible, and I want to thank all who submitted articles. Please keep those submissions coming, we have another issue to fill this next year. Actually, we already have a good start on the next issue. Algis Mickunas has two articles on civilizational structures of consciousness that haven't been published. Look for them in the next issue.

Please note, if you haven't already, that the next meeting/conference of the Jean Gebser Society for the Study of Culture and Consciousness, will be October 21–24, 1999, at Governors State University, University Park, Illinois. A CFP will be included in a future mailing. The tentative topic for the conference is the Global cyber Tech & Integral Consciousness—there has already been a significant response. See the details coming soon to our website:

http://www.govst.edu/ie_journal/

There is also a new Gebser email list for the discussion of issues centered around culture and consciousness. There are presently around 20 participants, with discussion being thin at times (there seems to be a critical mass of 50 or so participants on an email list to keep discussion moving). There has been some lively discussion at several points about consciousness, and members have been actively sharing bibliographic references and querying others for information and support with academic projects. Anyone can join (assuming you have an email account).

To join send an email to:

Listproc@ecnet.net

In the message area of the email include the following:

Subscribe gebser Your_first_name Your_last_name (include *your* name)

That's all. In a matter of minutes you will be informed of your inclusion and receive instructions on how to use the list. Please join us online.

By the way email is the fastest growing communication medium around, growing at 8–10% each month, compared to the web which is only growing at 3–5%. Email is becoming very wide-spread and it requires minimal technology (an old 286 PC will do) and is easy to use. With email and email lists “community” can be formed quickly and individuals can communicate with each other in an interactive exchange that can often be very responsive—almost vital. I'm loath to use terms like “vital,” though I think there are vital elements at work in these communities.

Miller's article in this issue addresses the question of cyber consciousness. This paper stirred quite a discussion at the Gebser conference in California, PA. Many of the issues of the cyber world do ask us to rethink our approaches to consciousness. Personally, however, I think they ask us more than ever to experience and understand the embodied consciousness that Gebser wrote about. The cyber world is

a wonderful way of interacting, but it fits within the world of human experience and consciousness.

This is just one of many fascinating articles in this issue of *Integrative Explorations Journal*—read and enjoy. And, please join our email list to discuss these issues with others who have similar interests.

Poems by Terry Linda Hauptmann*

Sarajevo 1993

For Rosemarie Basic

Ic hore, sic nennen das Leben
die einzige zuflucht
I hear that they call life
our only refuge
Paul Celan

It is either the beginning or the end
of the world, and the choice is ourselves
or nothing.
Carolyn Forche

I called out to the living but the dead responded.
Giuseppe Tournatore

Waiting for the war to end

You a mixed-blood with the mixed bloods
All mixed-blood Serbs and Croats
Where the dead light candies with the dead
Looking for a way out of history.

"Can you believe I have no country?"

"Can you believe what I saw
Dipping into death at the blackmarket?"

A wound in that pulse of wind

An old woman in the ruins
Begging for life
So many bodies in mass graves
Where the dead are buried in playgrounds
Searching for life.

* Terry Linda Hauptmann is a poet and painter, whose travels have taken her to many spiritual centers of the world, but her home is Vermont. She exhibits her paintings nationally and reads her poetry in performance rhapsodically. Her poems have appeared in *Since Heavenly Muse!*, *Contact 11*, *Southern Review*, *Icon*, *Blue Mesa*, *High Plains Review*, and other publications. Her art, displayed here alongside her poetry has appeared in many galleries (originals are in color).

"I called out to the living,
But the dead responded."

Whilst clogs carry
A dead man's legbone
Across silent spaces
Dust and ash
This blue gash of winter.



Figure 1 – Dance (woodcut) by Terry Linda Hauptman

THE MURMUR OF THE SILENCE

For Meheen

Whose fire within fire carries her like a bird
on the dark side of the beach

In Lurs Iran

You trade chicken's eggs for books
In the theater of the walking dead
Your mother shouting
"Sarakhur" "you have killed your father"
Outcast
Cursed
Hated one

How the pomegranate trees
with there "zereshk" deep dark burgundy color
drip blood
"You have to touch the fallen
and go down and fall
until you stand up"*

You have to fall fall down into the corpses
before you can rise rise up again.

And now listening to Hossein Alizadeh's music

"The Echo of the Sun"
The wind whips everything away
Lightning and thunder
The Disharmony of Fate
Talking with God in the hummingbird winds
Deep with inner darkness
Quick with inner light
Wise people get scared.

*Ahmad Shamloo Iranian poet

THE SERPENT MOUNDS*

Adams County, Ohio

I turn left when the music turns right
But it still sings through me
Haunting the Serpent Mounds
With threats of condominiums
Built on the already excavated
Bones of the Adena forgotten.

If dreams are our fears
This must be stopped
This must be stopped.

I am chased by the spirits of destruction
Lightning and winds
Calling to the disappeared

Hot flash of light
Crossing open space
As the serpent sheds its skin
Swallowing the egg of centuries
In a moment's roar

And I taste the living embers
In this century of the living
Drawing you near

Where I see the destruction of a whole people
From the veils of fear
Watching my own small death enter
Screaming wordlessly.

*The Serpent Mounds were built for ceremonial purposes by the Adena People in 11th century A. D.

It is also said the Serpent Mounds were built by the Adena Tribe 100 B.C. and 700 A.D.

The Serpent Mounds consist of an effigy mound and three burial mounds. The serpentine effigy, nearly a quarter mile long represents a gigantic serpent in the act of uncoiling. The oval wall of earth at the head represents the serpent's open jaws. The length of the effigy proper following the convolutions and the coils of the tail is 1,254 feet.




Figure 2—Day of the Dead (woodcut) by Terry Linda Hauptman

SONGS OF SHEBA

For Barbara Clark

"We shall not escape Hell my passionate sisters"

Marina Tsvetaeva

"in the sea-depths of music we voyage together"

Odysseus Elytis

Tonight the watchers of the Red Sea
Call us back to ourselves
Talking to each other Scapegoat to scapegoat
"Land for Peace" is a cry away
Goddess of Birth and Death Make it happen.
Who listens in the dark?

Southeast of Santa Fe
Shadows edge Galisteo's ancient sea
We climb cordillera clouds of dust
Our Songs of Sheba swept away
By mesa birds and turquoise winds
Cries rise from the radioactive highway

What secret of this century
Turns our back on ourselves
Listening to the Deep Voice of the Desert Mothers
Singing in the Canyons del Muerto
The Ruins of Death?

Night hips lean on the ancient coral reefs of Tijeras
"Who is coming up from the desert
Leaning on her Beloved"
Lost in the Song of Songs
Listening to the lapis jazz of dawn
Ghosting the desert with its thunder?

Speak to me from the sea-depths
Of your Shulamite pulse
Or your Spider-rock hips
Entering this red cliff house of words
Memory of fire in the cave of rain
Where I speak with my hands

While you sing your siren-sea
In the burnt dusk of the dead year
Who listens in the dark?




Figure 3—Archeology of Consciousness (woodcut) by Terry Linda Hauptman

BLOODSTAR

"For months now the sky has been red"

Mary McAnally

For months now the sky has been red

Death rattle echoing Anil de Muerto

Day of the Dead

Madre de Dios with knife at her hip

Marauding through the radioactive desert

The Sangre de Cristos

The flint hills give away the thundah

Spark dolorosa

Firepepper spittle that calls me back branching

Acequia Madre Mother Ditch

Queen Ida's zydeco breastplate

Hugging adobe hips

Now that I have lost you

Like Goya's firing squad

Or Lorca's death

For months now the sky has been red.

My soul knows enough is never enough

And seeks you in every fermenting flame

Pinion cedar sage

Broomweed yellow chamisa hoop of wind

Children in the streets gather glitter dust

For the feast of the peasants

Shimmying to "Garlic is as Good as Ten Mothers"

Rubbed down by the spirits

And the green night river runs backwards

To watchbirds on the Rio Grande

Blue corn white corn yellow corn

Searing winds.

Santa Fe New Mexico

Onion Skin

Roger Cook

Ohio University

The prose/poetry piece entitled “Onion Skin” is intended to be presented on transparent sheets. The transparent sheets allow the reader to sample the writing in a random order. The reader is able to experience several pages simultaneously. The transparent sheets allow the reader to read one page while alternating lines with the pages behind—placing lines between lines in whatever order—in an integrative fashion. This work is to be different every time it is read—indeterminate and overdetermined. As the writer, I recommend that the work be copied onto transparent sheets. I feel the intent of the work can best be accessed in this manner. The pages are not numbered, there is no beginning or end. It defies perspectival, causal, and teleological interpretation. The work is an instance of the questions we ask of it influencing the answers we get, while the answers we get influence the questions we continue to ask.

Different poets, philosophers, artists, novelists and musicians are nested in the work. Playing with intertextualism, I have some quotes that are not cited from sources, and fragments of conversations are reproduced as well. I was influenced by the works of Franz Kafka, Friedrich Nietzsche, Arthur Rimbaud, Albert Camus, Rainer Rilke, the list goes on and on. I was also very influenced by American popular and counter culture. Alice Cooper and James Joyce can be found in these pages with Zeno and John Lennon. As well as the obvious influence of Jean Gebser.

Idealists and materialists are both like two children on a seesaw who have been teetering back and forth for two thousand years. Now one now the other is on top and shouts 'Hurrah!' while the other summons all his weight to be able to do the same; and thus the game goes on. Each thinks that his own weight and strength is decisive, and neither considers the fulcrum in the middle which, from it's point of rest, is what makes their movement and the game itself possible at all. Jean Gebser *The Ever-present Origin* p 237.

Total A^auⁿt^ao^rn^ch^my. Nature, what kinds of things occur in
nature
Parent's kill children~children killing parents~
abandonment~lonely death

Death of the spirit and body before there is a chance to grow

This Death is Justified without Justification

But our societies try to determine our laws of action

Are they necessary, contingent, Transcendental~ necessary:

Yes~No

Complementary, contrary and relative~ contingent and
incommensurable with nature

Again ~NoT The Categories are imposed~they are transcendental and
emergent~local

I don't want it~them to end but it~they cannot hold

Overdeterminism, Quantum causality and mutations. But any list is not
exhaustive~ is it ~

Meno

I have calculated all possible combinations in all possible worlds

I have calculated the positions of all the planets from the beginning of
time to the end

Alpha and Omega. Why is this shit? INSECURITY that is my problem

Afraid to breath~to be wrong and crazy. I've never cared about the
norm why now

Absurd. I'm frozen in a discourse grown static

Unless confirmed and established just Looking Through A Glass Onion
Transparent layers of overdetermined, acausal, arational, aperspectival,
flowing: Integration.

This is the spirit?! I will show them~prove my worth. The kid who
can't spell.

The HEAD. Manifest destiny. Lost bullshit. But I've forgotten constructive
discussion is there such a thing?!

Themes of existentialism that run through almost all walks of life~if we
look hard enough

Symptoms of the spirit of our age. Oh, I need an argument
I'll be destroyed you say

Look in your heart of hearts and here is your Justification
joy of war, the arrogance of believed apodictic certainty

Arrogance again a trait of our age
it's all been thought it's all been said it's all been done

All that is left is negative dialectic ~playing of ideas off of each other until
they disintegrate Only I know the truth. But truth
again~Truths.

Einstein a pa~there of exploration of multi~perspectival equalities and
inequalities

Time to see the reasons of a boat rocking on an iceberg of Euclid's
world

Breaking the bounds~to Being. But who cares about Being
Negation itself that is where it~dread~ the awareness of Being is
It is. It is not. It is and it is not; Therefore, it is Can the
Cogitator Contemplate negation itself

The beetle rolls in ecstasy when nothingness abounds
Squash~another~ Squash, the mindless cricket~death comes to
those who wait

Life through the milk of the Sxe

Thank you for the womxn that I learned sensitivity from
I still cry~I'm ashamed and proud because of it. Yes, the Mask
Not the Mask of power through deceit but the Mask of protection from
the predatory.

The killers of feeling. Why have they been dominate in my time
Even if God is dead this is not "the" cause. It has been that way for a
big minute

Weakness, the game whimpers in death. Has it always been this way

Dominate or be dominated~ I am both: much more

"Quis custodiet ipsos custodes."

"Who watches the watchmen?"

Juenal, Satires, VI, 347.

A primary paradox of the ages

The temporal and the timeless

Consistent with the concept of mathematical formalism

Insert any name , any category, any organization. Who polices the police

Who dictates mortality to the moral? VAio drugs the druggies?

Who empowers the powerful?

The watchmen are the most powerful and responsible for watching

o^u v^b e^r us?

Who watches over them? Corrupt cops~They don't narc on each other, do
they?

I've seen them <legion > revel in their lawless abuse of power~if indeed
there is such a thing.

Are we all slaves to the machine

People ruled by the rules of impersonality, bureaucrats and ill
~communication

The bureaucracies, atomized and set to function on their own
Self~referential, autonomous, a wheel set in motion by the dominate
justification of history

Like the Roman symbol of power the syntax of the torch of wrapped twigs
burns on

A twig burns away~falls and is replaced by another~ Twigs of replaceable
numbers

Thank the statisticians. What is a person? I

That's all ~~the equations of the happiness of cost benefit analysis~thank
you

Sterility of the equations

But what, who watches us~ we do

"The Ranger isn't going to like it Yogi." Boo~Boo.

But I am still not a part of a culture

My rules may for the most part, in operation, be in line with those
described as legal

I hate these fucking people. Who said that the legal is the least you can
get away with

i'm a little boy~ NO I'M A GrEAT BIG MAN~nol LeT's be A littlE boY,

For just a little while longer. STEVEN~ I here them calling my
name~STEVEN.

The external legal. internal legal is where the law is

The Truest of laws come from within.

When nomos falls physis dominates~again~ I can accept only what I
will~No

It's someone else's fault~ I don't believe that the atoms swerve and run
into each other

When I wistfully sit and wonder ~is there a way out

Is the end coming or a new beginning

What must it be> No, what must they being

No, What must , choice, can't be~my, yours our, his, her, they, be, have
been, will be being

Intensity of color and time

Swirling like Tupperware on fire~ colors~melting candles of irreversible
process of smoking

cigarettes in the honky-tonk

Zeno showed at the beginning of our epoch and now we are beginning to
understand

Fractal Venn diagrams. Eternal, boundless, yet not necessary cyclical

Cyclical and not Cyclical another contradiction **THROW IT OUTT**

All contradictions ~**THROW THEM OUTT** Only true and false

Go ahead I'll shelf your books in the wrong place

In four Libraries of interconnections your book will be lost

your name will not be in order

Now you must wait an eternity to enter but don't worry we have more
eternities

In a discussion between two people the first asserts that
Law, and justice are the cornerstone of society and culture
The second asserts that law and Justice are ~constructions
The powerful keep the common subdued through slavery~ Are We
How do we become free from the anti~thetical positions asserted by these
two
When I was a kid I dreamt that people were happy with their places in life
To each their own~ The Yin and Yang of existence
The good flowing into the bad as the bad flows into the good The poles of
the soul
How can it be
Be~ the word itself is inadequate to describe this process
Be is static where the flowing of Yin and Yang is a process
The exit door leads in
The path to and from are one and the same~ Bring us back, let us go
Deconstruct us~ reconstruct us
In slave us as we make our selves free
Feelings are not important Libenitz wants sufficient reason~ is Mxn
reducible to this
One and many~ individual and social~ The anti~thetical
Slavery in our epoch crumbles into the fragmentation
The new chapels will rise from the old~ Yes, No. True, False. Good, Bad.?!
Subject, predicate, Who What Where When Why How A causes b

Chaos and overdeterminism what's wrong with it~ NoT What's Right~
Left, Right

When god dies the divine in man dies ~War is a watch word for these
times

But how can this be

Be again

"Prediction is very difficult, especially for the future." Niels Bohr.
oceanic thinking from things that are ~now~ only as real as we let
them be

We have destroyed our history in a blinding flash of fragmentation and
denial

We make the latency of our whole being manifest only after we have
relearned

Suspend belief in the dogma of dogmas

The transparency of making concrete our whole selves

In the potential of now is a step to the freedom of the complete
realization of freedom

Freedom to, freedom from

Until constructive discussion is sought slavery to will be the
consequence

Why have they ~the intelligentsia not realized this

Everybody knows that the dice are loaded everybody knows that the
fight is fixed... everybody knows, the world is
crumbling

The shallow attempts to treat others as ends in themselves

How are people supposed to feel when no one cares how they
feel

((Social) scientists) philosophers) can not even communicate
Hidden behind the visions of the hats they wear. Each thinks they have
exclusive paths to truth~ Truth again a word that is
inadequate: Truths.

Haven't they heard that people communicate with each other if they
make an attempt

Why can't disappears~ What is human~ the perpetuation of the species~
atoms in motion 1.

You're an equation that can be determined by an equation~ A box you
can't be free

A box to live in~ Live~ Nietzsche was right~ Live dangerously
Life is in the living of it not the reading about it, the dreaming about it
Allow the totality of our potential to manifest and achieve freedom only
few have dreamt

Fewer have realized~ The whole~self

Should we ride the boat of death. We already do the question is irrelevant

The boat of death

Myth and magic degenerate in mental terms Yet we understand and why

A dream began to form from the inside out which became aware of itself

It's awareness spreads to other dreams The dreamer awakens to the
reality of this

This is it~ is it!?

The end beginning middle and end

The end creates the beginning but the middle is past

This is now a story of stories a level of levels

I'm lost in the despair of everything and nothing

But I still dream

A child lost the hope of love, the hope in love.

An adult has died before becoming

Hope was, will and may always be as a slicing razor that apologizes before
slicing.

Oh, I'm sorry but you lost your dream to a knife

Values, important to our continued existence

We decide on actions, thoughts and more by how we value things
intrinsic value is where autonomy lies Nothing can be worth more than
the truly priceless

The restrictions that we place ourselves in are the truly priceless.

We know that we can be rocks, plants, tapioca pudding and various
shades of human.

Is it is that Human is

Is that the hero that everyone cheers for ~How can it be other

God is dead

Your love I have tried to win~ I've tried to be apart of your world

I've studied your philosophies~ I've taken your hand outs

I've lived in the partly constructed illusionary phantasy of your creation

My freedom I've given. No longer

I. the itself Will remember what it was like before my slavery to the
system of masses
organized repression~ Before was a self imposed giving of my being to
uncaring ends
teleologically no better~ are the answers in the ends
Where to go when options are nothing more than whimsical dreams
Dead/alive~simulacrum: live discourse/ dead discourse. What is it to care
Are we, am I beyond good and evil~ Is god dead ~ Yes and no~god is dead
and alive
I am good and evil~ Not contradiction but complementary~ Not causal but
chaos
Time is no longer just quantifiable
The hedonistic calculus of pleasure and pain can, has never been an
accurate account of the
intensity of feeling
Time can not have been as we have believed it to be
the ticking of the second hand is the realization of Zeno's paradox of the
tortoise realizable
Sweeping seconds, and a big minuet are new ways of understanding
Yet we still hold on to past conceptions: incorporating those necessary to
the present
Old values have seemingly drawn their final conclusions our
growing awareness of their simplicity and the changed context that these
values try to
work in have illuminated this~ For those who believe in the divine command
system of values their decisions are made for them~ Easy to follow

mindless~ the herd morality The doctrines are part of the problem &
Sophists abundant

Existential respect seems to be a possible answer to a warring activity
that has been going on

~ and on for thousands of years

My god's dick is bigger than your god's

How many deaths have been Justified in this way the
crusades the witch hunts the ((anti) abortionists)

The stupidity of the past is what we want to get away
from

Nature the surrounding world, other human beings must be ruled so that
man is not ruled by them. This fear that man is compelled to rule the outside
world is systematic of our times. Every individual who fails to recognize that
he must rule himself falls victim to that drive. Jean Gebser *The Ever-present
Origin* p.51

The Battle of Magic against Myth in American Elections

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Elections have become boring. A generation ago, when the television age was young and the application of the new polling technology was in its childhood, it seemed to many that we were entering a period of wider participation by a better-educated and informed electorate in a process that would raise the practice of democracy to a new level. Today it is notorious that our electoral process, particularly at the national level, has become a self-referential process, dominated by competing groups of campaign professionals armed with the weapons of electronic age marketing, and serving obscure interests who fund the elaborate campaigns to attend ends that are seldom discussed in public. The voters are turning out in fewer numbers, and government at times hardly seems worthy of the name. The “political analysts” who are such an integral part of manipulation are, of course, helpless to explain the consequences of what they set in motion.

Though they would be loathe to acknowledge it, the work of the “analysts” does not produce some kind of knowledge that is complete in itself; their practices are embedded in a broader context of culture and meaning. They take this for granted, even as they influence and are influenced by it. Despite argument and evidence to the contrary, their analyses are presented as complete in themselves, and, therefore, unchallengeable. Even when analysts disagree among themselves, their basic inability to see beyond the presuppositions and contradictions that underlie their activity prevent them from questioning deeply or coming to terms with the changing perceptual structures that may dissolve our notions of democracy while the talk shows gabble on.

This paper proposes to use some of the insights of Jean Gebser to explore elections and the problems with the way we have come to address them. Those familiar with Gebser would, of course, agree that the forbidden topic of consciousness and its variations is the necessary starting point of any social analysis and that changes in culture must eventually be addressed in these terms. But the prevailing rhetoric and habits of thought in what passes for the public domain make this a difficult undertaking.

Of course, this is nothing new. Our well-publicized election analysts are subsets of a much larger group that does precisely the same thing in a number of fields of study. And it is just as well known that what happens when cultural contexts shift is notoriously baffling for the “experts” who find their carefully crafted predictive models disintegrating before their eyes. The breakup of the Soviet Union is one conspicuous example of a major change that no analyst predicted. Another more obscure example is closer at hand. Though the academic discipline of political science embraced, refined, and propagated the technique of polling, I am not aware

that any of the pioneers in this movement predicted that the widespread practice of polling would contribute to the institutional decline of the political parties and growing citizen indifference to elections. Indeed, most political scientists hold as an article of faith that political parties are a good thing. They believe this as fervently as they believe that polling is the acme of scientific political analysis. That the two cherished beliefs may be contradictory at some level is incomprehensible to them.

Perhaps this sheds some light on why the analysts/scientists can't explain what they do know: the parties attract less loyalty today than they ever have, voter turnout is low and getting lower, and modern communications media have evidently succeeded in putting more, not less, distance between the electorate and elected officials. These observations are confirmed by the polls themselves. As far as public affairs are concerned, the public is disgruntled, alienated, disappointed, whatever... pick your adjective. Our Pontifex Maximus has judged us to be "in a funk;" one of his predecessors opined that we were bogged down in "malaise." The "nattering nabobs of negativism" may have actually won something after all, but it's not clear what.

Maybe it has something to do with "political culture," whatever that is. The scientist/analyst would have to reply that such matters are mysterious, subjective, and, therefore, closed to rational inquiry. However, even though the "science of society" has nothing to tell us about this, the alert media analyst, faced with the prospect of either saying something anyway or losing his or her place in front of the camera, is led as if by an invisible hand to choose the former and blabber on, though more in the rhetorical mode of the oracle at Delphi than that of Max Weber.

It should be no surprise that the cumulative public reaction to this procession of delphic utterances seems to be that of the jury at Socrates' trial: shut up or die. Happily for Novak, Kinsley, McLaughlin, & Co., American jurisprudence hasn't figured out a procedure for enforcing such verdicts. The channel changer is the American democrat's sole instrument of authority.

But must we consent to be dragged into this morass of personal speculation that appears before us as soon as behavioral analysis breaks down? I think it's clear that Gebser would certainly say "No." Public attitudes are a matter of consciousness in the transitive sense, that is, consciousness *of* something. Clearly, the public consciousness of voting, elections, and campaigns bears examination in terms of consciousness itself. We need not accept the vapping of columnists and commentators, because we need not accept the methodological blinders (numbers are objective and real; everything else is fantasy) permanently put in place so long ago. If we explore the matter of campaigns with changes in consciousness in mind, as well as different patterns of consciousness, perhaps we can use Gebser's

work to discover something of interest. (For a general sketch of this see Mickunas, in Kramer, ch. 5.)

Since one cannot make observations on the decline of voting without presuming a decline *from* something, we might as well start by recapitulating some of the history of American political parties and seeing to what extent we can fathom the consciousness of the original partisans. It is accepted that American political parties took their present shape in the 1830's and that the first "modern" two-party Presidential election was the election of 1840. In that year the Democratic candidate was incumbent President Martin Van Buren. Since the collapse of the Federalists after the Democratic sweep of the Congress and the Presidency in 1800, the Democrats had been the only nationally organized party. But the organizers of the Whig campaign in 1840 mounted a series of efforts that mobilized voters on an unprecedented scale, stimulated very high levels of voting and participation, and won the election for them.

How this was achieved merits a review. The Whigs used a new institution, the national convention, as their nominating device; the party faithful came in person to make their choice. However, the delegates were led in the process. The organizers of the convention passed over the logical candidates—Henry Clay and Daniel Webster—in favor of Gen. William Henry Harrison. Compared to Clay and Webster, Harrison was less identified with specific policies, was widely popular, and possessed a military record as an Indian fighter. This record (or absence of one) made it possible to fit the candidate to the exigencies of the campaign. What became the famous theme of the campaign was originally a slur that appeared in a Democratic newspaper, a sarcastic observation that the old general would be content to sit in front of a log cabin, drink hard cider, and collect his military pension.

The Whigs adroitly and aggressively turned this to their advantage by organizing an unprecedented level of mass activities around the image of the simple frontier soldier with his log cabin and hard cider. The well-known irony underlying this image was Harrison's descent from one of the most aristocratic of Virginia's First Families; he had been born on the plantation that had been in the family since the 1600's. The irony is worth mentioning because it was completely irrelevant to the course of the campaign. The frontier experience was fresh in the memories of large numbers of voters, and the image resonated in their imaginations. With consummate skill and an energy that bordered on frenzy, the Whigs pressed the use of it to the limit. Apart from the image, the party had already been organized to appeal directly to the voters in every state and county. First, though the telegraph had yet to become an instrument of mass communication, mass communication was achieved through weekly newspapers that were circulated nationally. Second, particular attention was paid to new voters; restrictions on voting had been falling for a generation, the population was

expanding, and the western states (west of the Appalachians) were seeking to exert their influence on national affairs. The Whigs even paid specific attention to courting the votes of the strange, outlandish immigrants from Germany. Third, the convention system of partisan nomination and party governance required that the party faithful themselves, as delegates to conventions, physically participate in choosing nominees.

With this rational structure of institutions and procedures in place, the campaign could exploit the popular appeal of “Tippecanoe and Tyler, Too.” The political memorabilia collection at the Smithsonian Institution gives us a sense of how pervasive the campaign effort was. A variety of artifacts displaying campaign themes were made for household use—china and other ceramics, hair brushes, snuff boxes, glassware. Whiskey bottles were made in the shape of a log cabin by E.G. Booz; an original Booz bottle is worth thousands in today’s antique market. The face of the candidate was presented on many of these as well as on banners and printed broadsides. Whig partisans erected log cabins and dispensed hard cider from them. But the most stirring events were the varieties of mass meetings, parades, and processions. Organizers claimed the largest gatherings ever seen in their localities. Torchlight parades must have been the most dramatic of these mass events, with the flare of pine knots the only light on the marching partisans. In at least several places giant balls, approximately ten feet in diameter and emblazoned with campaign slogans, were rolled by large groups of young men from town to town. Music evidently played a large part in the efforts. A number of song books were published; the largest campaign songbook, *The Harrison Medal Minstral*, was 192 pages long and held about 120 songs. One participant in the campaign of 1840 later recorded: “The most distinguishing feature of the campaign was its music. The spirit of song was everywhere, and made the whole land vocal. The campaign was set to music ...and poured itself forth.... (Quoted in Melder, pp.86-87.) As a footnote, the use of torchlight parades reached its apex in the campaign of 1860 with the formation of large groups of Republican “Wide-Awake” marching units, complete with military-style uniforms. Observers thought these ominous demonstrations extraordinarily powerful and impressive.

In closing this brief sketch, it should be noted that the voter turnout rose from the 1836 level of about 58% to over 80%. The Democrats complained that they were “lied down, drunk down, and sung down,” but Harrison was elected. In an effort to live up to the reputation created for him in the campaign, he gave his inaugural address bareheaded in sleeting weather, caught pneumonia, and died a month after taking office.

What is clear in the light of Gebser’s work is that the campaign embodied, among other things, a powerful, varied appeal to the magical consciousness. In a way that was possibly unique to this campaign, hearing was a critically significant mode of perception. The music of the campaign was noted at the time; thousands of partisans gathered and listened to speeches that went on

for hours. One hundred and fifty years after the fact we all still have a residual familiarity with the intrinsically pointless and endlessly repeated campaign slogan “Tippicanoe and Tyler, too.” The continual, orchestrated movements of masses of marching men embodied a specifically visceral appeal. The overriding spirit of the campaign was a celebration of the conquest of nature and the assertion of will.

In this description we recognize some of the key elements of Gebser’s description of the magical consciousness. As Gebser put it, “...release from nature is the struggle which underpins every significant will-power-drive and, in a very exact sense, every tragic drive for power.” (*EO*, p.51.) This is not to suggest that it would be accurate to characterize the entire campaign as magical. Some of the campaign materials struck mythic notes as well. Long before television or photojournalism, the voters wanted to become acquainted with the visages of their political heroes. George Washington’s face became familiar from the multitude of prints that were circulated in the late 18th century. Representations of Andrew Jackson survive from his Presidential campaigns—some show him as a rough frontiersman, others give him a Napoleonic aspect, complete with French haircut, brushed forward on the side and tousled on top. Some of Harrison’s campaign portraits took on the same appearance. The campaigns presented themselves as polar opposites, us against them. And, even if no one else looked very rational, the organizers of the campaign were rational, goal-oriented, ego-centered, acquisitive moderns. But our concern here is not with mythic or rational consciousness, but with the magical consciousness, to see if it can shed light on some of the current questions that revolve around public participation in politics.

Among political historians the campaign of 1840 has taken on a bad reputation. It was a “hoopla” campaign, devoid of serious discussion of issues; it set a bad example by getting voters fired up over slogans, images, and crowd scenes. The fecklessness of the Tyler administration and the slide toward war probably have added in retrospect to the sense of pointlessness that attends the memory of this election. Also, in not much more than a decade, the Whig party itself was clearly headed to oblivion, unable to keep its coalition together in the face of the overwhelming passions that surrounded the slavery issue. The new Republican party took over much of the Whig party outside the South and used much of what had been invented 20 years before to win the Presidency in 1860. Abraham Lincoln actually had been born in a log cabin on something like the frontier. The campaign image of “Honest Abe,” the rail-splitter, was reminiscent of the image-making that had surrounded Harrison. The explicitly military posture of the “Wide-Awakes,” thousands of men marching by torchlight in home-made military uniforms, set the tone for what was to come.

Oddly, the election of 1840 meets the standards used today to identify an ideal election campaign. A much larger voter turnout was generated than in previous elections, the parties were competitive across the entire country, the

public participated vigorously and enthusiastically, and a new political grouping that promised to reform government gained power. It was also the high water mark of appeals to the magical consciousness in 19th century elections. This is an uneasy judgement to place next to the original justification for using elections to choose governing officials.

In the 18th century proponents argued that elections were a more rational set of arrangements for choosing rulers than hereditary monarchy. Continuing to adhere to the traditional way of crowning kings on the basis of heredity, as opposed to public choice on the basis of personal merit and political program, would put the nation at risk of being ruled by chance and whimsy. It would be far more rational to put power in the hands of popularly elected legislators. If not all of the voters could be expected to use reason in making their choice, it was still possible to make wise constitutional arrangements that would in their operation achieve rational results. For example, review Madison's claims in *Federalist #10* for what he referred to as "the scheme of representation." Others have argued that rationality in election choice need not depend on the voters having extensive knowledge of government and of cause-effect relationships in matters of policy; it is enough for them to indicate whether they think things are going well or not either by voting for incumbents or by voting to replace them. This obviously makes more sense in a unitary nation governed by a parliamentary system than in a federal system with separate elections for President and Congress, as well as separate powers and elections for state and local officials. There is an extensive literature on these issues; much effort has gone into buttressing the rationalist justification for elections, from one perspective or another. It suffices for our purposes to note the problematic place of rationality in campaigns.

What does merit attention is the appearance of an extended effort to inculcate a culture of rationality in American electoral activity, in effect, to replace the outright magic with at least a myth of rationality, if not rationality itself. This can be traced to the Progressive movement of about a century ago. The history of this movement is available in such detail and has been written about so much that a short review of it requires a certain amount of foolhardiness. I will provide it. At the turn of the century, the political parties were locked in the sectional molds that they had been in since the 1850's and were to remain in for decades to come. The Democrats' dependable electoral strength lay in the South, and the Republicans were the party of Northern and Midwestern towns and farms. Democratic machines held sway in many large cities, and Republican machines enjoyed similar power in some. The bedrock of party strength lay in inherited loyalties and in the patronage that was handed out to the party faithful.

The leadership of the Progressive movement came from outside the ranks of the parties that occupied the positions of governance. The two Presidents most associated the movement were Woodrow Wilson and Theodore

Roosevelt, Wilson a Democrat and Roosevelt a Republican, though one regarded suspiciously by party “regulars.” Both can be regarded as intellectuals; they read and wrote extensively. Some of Wilson’s works are still in print, and “TR” continues to receive respectful treatment from biographers. Both joined organizations devoted to governmental reform. Wilson was a university professor of political science, a new discipline then, and was an early president of the American Political Science Association.

The journalists who made the most noteworthy contributions to the literature of the Progressive movement conducted extensive research into their topics and acquired the nickname “Muckrakers” in grudging homage to their capacity to unearth embarrassing facts. One of the most noteworthy of these efforts, Upton Sinclair’s *The Jungle*, is still in print. In law, attorney Louis Brandeis, later to become a Supreme Court justice, used extensive factual investigations in presenting cases for his clients, and in his honor such research-based legal briefs became known as “Brandeis briefs.”

As the figure of Wilson reminds us, the social sciences made their appearance in the nation’s colleges and universities at this time. In these years research and reform were often linked in a desire to modernize and rationalize society.

The first point of attack was the pattern of politics and partisanship that had reached its maturity in 1840. The use of patronage to staff governmental positions would come to an end. Official positions would be filled by career civil servants who would be trained experts in their specialties. Government regulation of various aspects of industrialization and urbanization would be carried out by honest officials who had the scientific and technical knowledge to do the work properly. This line of thought led to a broader advocacy of professionalism in governance, particularly the creation of the profession of city management. The proponents of this reform were taking specific aim at the “machine” politics that had come to typify local government in small as well as large cities. Public administration became a new field of research and training.

Political reform was part of the agenda of the Progressives. Just as government was to be rationalized, so the process of choosing elected officials would be rationalized. The number of elected offices would be reduced to a number that voters could be expected to be able to learn about. Corruption would be reduced through such administrative controls as voter registration. In the South, literacy tests became a favored way to eliminate voters who could not exercise good judgement from the rolls, which number included some whites as well as most blacks. The parties themselves could not be trusted to carry on their own affairs on behalf of their adherents, so primary elections were introduced to break the power of the conventions. Nonpartisanship became a legal requirement in some places, preventing the appearance of party labels on the ballot, at least for some state and local

offices. These devices, coupled with voter education campaigns sponsored by organizations like the League of Women Voters, aimed at making the voter a more rational chooser.

In Gebser's terms, the Progressive movement can be interpreted as a thorough, self-conscious drive to eliminate the magical elements of the politics inherited from the 19th century. The animus of this effort was, quite literally, progressive. The old superstitions had to be set aside and the new and better embraced. Those who could not accept this needed to be defeated politically, and, though it took two generations, the victory was eventually complete. From our vantage point, we can see that the progressives failed to fully understand the rationality they thought they knew so completely. This failure is amply demonstrated by the fate of the logical positivism that formed the philosophical foundation of their thought.

Gebser helps us see a fundamental flaw. They were so purposefully disdainful of sentiment and myth that they remained blind to the mythical elements in their confident rationalism. Suffice it to say that the progressive movement saw itself as a force for good engaged in a momentous struggle against the forces of backwardness and ignorance. That struggle would be led by heroes who embodied the rational ideal—TR and Wilson. Constitutionally, the presidency would become the tool by which the hero could reshape society, with the assent of those waiting to be led forward. The advent of same-day news would make the office a "bully pulpit," an excellent elevated place from which to deliver enlightening sermons to those whom the nation had united.

The tacit mythic structure of the progressive movement is worth a paper in its own right, but our concern here is with the magical consciousness, so we will not pursue this line of inquiry further. Instead, the remainder of the paper will address the question of the magical consciousness and the extent to which it has been removed from 20th century American politics.

President William J. Clinton's re-election in the 1996 presidential campaign makes him the last President inaugurated in the 20th century. His campaign had taken shape a full year before the election. Further, we knew how it would be waged. The principal means for contacting the public were not rallies or speeches or spectacles such as torchlight parades and rolling huge balls through the countryside. Banners and posters were not a major means of circulating the image of the candidates, nor did we see the candidates' faces reproduced on sundry household items. Few songs were composed in their honor. The parties did not publish national newspapers. Schoolchildren did not amass collections of campaign buttons. Few citizens had a sense of being swept up in partisan necessity. Not many people voted; a little over half of the eligible electorate took the trouble to go to the polls. We did not feel exalted at the prospect of choosing a brilliant successor to Washington and Jefferson; we will feel distressed at having to choose the lesser of two evils. We heaved sighs of relief when it was over.

What we were relieved to have gotten rid of was a campaign waged almost exclusively by television and direct mail. Both the winning and losing campaigns spent tens of millions of dollars on these communications media, and similar amounts were be separately spent on Congressional races. The various newsgathering organizations spent a great deal of money providing news coverage of the campaigns. The use of direct mail has been important since 1972, when computerized mailing lists were first used in a national campaign (McGovern's). With the right mailing lists, direct mail makes it possible to communicate with smaller, more narrowly defined segments of the broadcast audience. Direct mail is also a potent fund-raising device. Those who devise the letters, refine the mailing lists, direct the high-speed printing/labeling/mailing, and rake in the money constitute an industry, with a reservoir of expertise that is seldom appreciated outside the industry itself. Like much of contemporary marketing, direct mail generates sophisticated demographic analyses of the population and can target sub-populations accurately, given enough time and money.

But television is the dominant form of communications. Almost every American household has a television set; television news is the principal source of news for a large majority of Americans and provides the elements of perception from which people construct political judgements. In the 1950's, when television was new, some hoped that it would be the crowning development of rational American democracy. Might not the electorate prepared by the progressive reforms early in the century now be able to witness politics for themselves and make educated judgments based on the "first-hand" information they receive? Voters could see and hear candidates for themselves and make their decisions about how to vote apart from the blandishments of party actives and historical prejudices.

Alas, it was not to be. Far from being a neutral presenter of "just the facts," television has turned out to be a highly constrained dramatic structure capable more of making people *think* they are seeing the "facts" than of actually presenting civic information. Recent critical work has exposed the dramatic structure of the hallowed 30-minute evening news program. Careful measurement of how the political news has changed over time offers additional insight into how this underlying structure conveys a sense of significance just in the way the "information" is presented. Kiku Addatto measured the length of sound bites given to Presidential candidates in the 1968 and 1988 Presidential elections. The average sound bite for a person running for the highest office in the land in 1968 was 42.3 seconds; by 1988 it had dropped to 9.8. In 1968 almost half of the bites were 40 seconds or more. In 1988 it was less than 1%. In 1968 candidates were allowed to speak for over a minute 21% of the time; it never happened at all in 1988. The pace of television requires a growing compression of all information, especially as competition for audience share increases. The pressure for dramatic impact increases as well. The news, the "free" television that candidates covet, is less

a presentation of the world than electronic Kabuki theater where the actors are required to perform traditional roles in progressively shorter periods of time.

The greatest single expenditure in Presidential campaigns is television advertising. The drive for dramatic compression is just as great here, if not more so. The candidate's image-makers must present a compelling message that will persuade jaded voters to vote for their person and not the opponent in no more than 30 seconds, maybe a minute if the campaign budget is in good shape. Consequently, "attack" ads are frequently the message of choice. This has less to do with the nefariousness of the new class of political parasites, the campaign consultants, than with the demands of the medium itself. Voters must unite and join in support of the candidate who will make a new nation, find a new frontier to tame, take a nation containing hundreds of millions of inhabitants that has been an ongoing operation for centuries and construct for it "a new beginning."

The third form in which television can be used is the less-pressured talk show or interview show format. These can be enormously important, so much so that Ross Perot may be said to have nominated himself in 1992 for President—successfully—on "Larry King Live." In these settings candidates can talk at length, present their personalities in an unhurried way, and convey a sense of intimacy, of union, between candidate and the deluded audiences.

In all of these presentations the aim of the candidate is to reinforce all of the other representations made by his/her campaign. In the parlance of the trade, it is important to stay "on message." The core image of the ads (those representations over which the campaign staff has the most control) must be supported by the essence of any particular news sound bite (news appearances must be carefully staged and rehearsed), and each must be reinforced by whatever is conveyed at greater length in the "soft" interviews. The very heart of the campaign is a trance-like concentration on the message of the campaign. Debate cannot contain any trace of dialectic, interview can have no self-revelation, ads can only marshal "us" against "them."

Of course, this involves no appeal to reason. The century- old progressive agenda has run its course and ends in a political process where the supremely rationalist political invention, the modern state, is run by magic. Gebser is unmistakable on this point:

We must again approach here...a phenomenon that is truly terrifying so long as we remain unenlightened about it . We refer to the incursion of deficient magic phenomena in our world—the regression noticeable everywhere of our rational attitude toward deficient magic.wherever we encounter a predominance of insistent requests; ...wherever we meet up with overweening emotionalism in mass assemblies, propaganda, slogans, and the

like, we may conclude that we are dealing mainly with essentially deficient manifestations of magic. (*EO*, pp. 153-154)

It remains to us to figure out what to do about it.

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Identity and Memory on Both Sides of Claude/Hosanna's Body

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Rien d'humain ne m'est étranger
Montaigne

To Montaigne's observation that nothing human is strange to him we may add that in modern times nothing on the stage is strange to us. The modern audience is invited to stand in with the actors in identifying with the characters and the dramatic action. We, the spectators, play a vital role as presentiators of the drama. The modern stage has raised the audience's awareness of itself as an essential player in the making of theatre. Association and recall are two of the most efficient tools the audience uses to concretize their sense of identity with that of the characters; characters whose irrepressible past, much like our own, prolongs itself in the present and extends itself into the future¹. Identity as a function of memory is the base upon which this relationship lies.

The question of identity is a multi-faceted, problematic query which is immediately related to the body. The first inkling of a person's identity is knowable through that person's body. A person's history is externalized through the body. We cannot identify a person without identifying that person's body. As Merleau-Ponty points out, we perceive through our bodies. Our senses awaken memory and, as Bergson claims, it is memory that fashions our perception. Our past experiences condition our awareness of the things around us. Because our perception is momentary and because those moments are not devoid of memory, it is not inconceivable that in some circumstances memory might create an illusive present. And, as our body is the carrier of the self, we costume our body to resemble this illusive reality². Because the body is the vehicle that carries our reality, it is therefore vital to identity. The body is also the background against which we play our drama.

The body as representative of the self, whose identity is shaded with memory and present and future time, may and usually does present a dilemma. The character who best embodies the travails of this journey is the protagonist of Michel Tremblay's homonymous play, *Hosanna*. In effect, he manages three identities: as Claude (when he dresses as a man), his habitual identity, he is a homosexual hairdresser by day; in the evening he dons the apparel of Hosanna (as the cabaret singer, woman), fancying herself a femme fatale of sorts³; and finally he plays Elizabeth Taylor/Cleopatra (a projection or unfolding of Hosanna). The climax of *Hosanna's* comedy of masques occurs one particular evening when she attends a soirée in the guise of Elizabeth Taylor in the role of Cleopatra⁴.

The body's role as signifier of the self is able to render one performance at a time. Tremblay's *Hosanna*, much like Pirandello's *Enrico IV* and Lorca's *Director/Enrique*⁵, demonstrates how the body and the self are not always exact mirror images. These characters adapt their bodies to their selves. They seek to express themselves through their bodies not only as they wish others to see them, but, more importantly, how they must see themselves.

Our bodies are pivotal in the world. We know the existence of other objects because we can walk around them, contemplate them with our bodies. If our bodies are in any way altered or masqued, this relationship we have with the things of the world is also modified. In other words, the world makes us aware of our difference. As we shall see, refuge behind the masque can be futile as the masque is an agent of both camouflage and disclosure.

Hosanna, *Enrico IV*, and the *Director* fashion their bodies to accommodate their alternate identities. This fashioning gives rise to the ambiguity between their *habitual* bodies and their *present* bodies. The body, the vessel of the self, is no longer an integral unit. *Hosanna* reveals the fragmentation that is inherent in the confusion of the identity of the body as self when the self, forced to live in contradiction to the habitual body and assaulted by memory, is now a divided entity. The result is an irresolvable juxtaposition between the internal self and the external body.

While the chasm between the internal identity and the external body may be wide, the two are not divorced from each other. The habitual body and the present body are rooted in the same quagmire of experience. It must be noted that the present body does not proceed from the habitual body. It is rather another expression of its coveted identity. In our context, the present body incarnates the alter ego.

In Tremblay's play, the character Claude/*Hosanna* is very aware of the dialectical relationship between what he is and what he seems and the chiasmus between his self and his alter ego. The self is aware of the presence of the other. The two are interwoven, taking from or encroaching on each other. Claude and *Hosanna*, the self and the other, the habitual body and the present body are unlikely bedfellows, however. Their co-existence is faulty, unevenly woven. Claude's present body (*Hosanna*) inspires ridicule for his habitual body. In other words, masqued as *Hosanna*, Claude does not fit well into her world. He fails at concretizing *Hosanna*.

The ultimate attempt at becoming and not just seeming female lies in Claude's insistence on being addressed as *Hosanna*⁶. To Claude the name *Hosanna* affirms his present self, the identity he has chosen. The habitual body does not disappear behind the present body. As the apparel itself, the name remains on the outside, much as a prop. The invocation of the feminine name is not sufficient to bridge the existential distance between Claude and his other. The name much like the identity is not inscribed in Claude's flesh. It remains separate; it is never assimilated. The name *Hosanna* is a sign of

the irreversible in Claude, of the otherness that will always remain objectified.

Characters seek visibility, to be seen and to see: to witness their audience seeing them, perceiving and believing in their external identity as the embodiment of their reality. The audience's acceptance of this exterior reinforces the characters' identity with their appearance. Characters and audience must co-exist. The theatre, Bruce Wilshire claims, is: "*The art of involvement and standing in, (it) involves us most intensely and enduringly when it deals explicitly with problems of standing in or involvement*⁷." That we, the audience, enable the character to stand in for us in the drama is a very intimidating state of affairs as it results in our forcibly gaining insight into our own identity and the shocking realization that our masque, as that of the characters, is a refuge from the reality we cannot live and consequently attempt to hide not only from our own audience but, more pertinently, from ourselves. "Woe to him who doesn't know how to wear his masque, be he king or Pope," cautions Pirandello in the voice of Enrico IV.

Claude is uncomfortable under his masque. He does not convince his audience/friends at the soirée. They mock him refusing his masque as monstrous in its transparency. Claude fools no one, not even himself. Hosanna is not strong enough a character to cause the audience to suspend disbelief, to identify with her, to accept her as a viable reality.

In order for the body to successfully perform the other, it must not view it as an object. The body must subjectify the other and fully integrate it into itself as subject. The body itself does not suffer change. It remains constant. Claude can never integrate Hosanna's identity into his own. Being Hosanna has become an object of his desire. Hosanna remains on the outside. The chiasmus between Hosanna and Claude is woven from the threads of Claude's homosexuality and those of Hosanna's feminine guiles in attracting males⁸. These are two elements of Claude's reality that engender the conflict in the tragicomedy that is his life.

Claude's disjointed sense of identity has been long entrenched in his memory. A small-town misfit who sees in Montréal the possibility of realizing his dreams, Claude lives in two realities, better said, two solitudes⁹. The homosexual Claude who was singled out in the small town fails again as Hosanna when she faces the crowd as she is scrutinized on stage during the soirée. Her performance of Cleopatra is not convincing just as Claude's performance of Hosanna is taunted by his lover, Cuirette. Claude's every attempt at reinventing his body results in appearing grotesque. He is a misfit among misfits. Each memory evoked through the donning of his masque recalls the past and plunges him into the same experience that he is ill-prepared to face but from which he is disempowered to disengage himself. Caught in this existential impasse, Hosanna seeks to obliterate the *real world* and fabricate for herself a magical reality. Magic as a mode of

existence is deficient and therefore causes Hosanna's "world of papier mâché" to collapse.

Pirandello cautions that the human character does not possess the "consistency, coherence and knowability" it has always thought to be an integral part of itself. The unreliable, piecemeal nature of memory is partly to blame for the self's inconsistencies. As Jean Gebser points out, memory provides the ego with awareness and this is part of what gives us our sense of identity. As memory is time-bound it freezes certain settings and replays them continuously, providing a false sense of concretion. The search for identity that Tremblay's, Lorca's and Pirandello's characters undertake is at once accessible and obfuscated through memory. Their body memory is an unreliable source for their identity.

Tremblay's Hosanna is the most effective exponent of the dilemma of body as self. Hosanna is skewered between her male body and her feminine identity. As Claude, she possesses a male body which every evening is made to "appear" as a female body always retaining evidence of its contrasting identity. At a very poignant moment in the play, after returning from her ill-fated evening as Cleopatra, Hosanna is at her make-up table, the altar where the transubstantiation fails to take place. Her make-up is still intact, but she has lowered her gown half way down her body revealing her masculine attributes. Hosanna's body makes her appear laughable, distorted¹⁰. It is the beginning of the end. And Hosanna is painfully aware of this. No longer feasible, her make-believe world is succumbing to the light of quotidian reality. Hosanna has begun to reflect upon herself and what she sees is the fading away of her alter ego.

Dramatic tension escalates as Hosanna vents her rage about her false friends deriding her during what she expected to be her moment of glory. The tragedy of her appearance is further intensified when Hosanna must admit to herself that her audience were all more convincing Cleopatras in their more beautiful and convincing costumes and make-up. Ignored at the entrance to the partyroom she felt as though she were falling through a black hole. Her investment in the evening left her bankrupt. Now Hosanna, the woman, the present body, is floating in nothingness. The habitual body, Claude, rises to the rescue and reclaims his identity. This marks a turning point in the play. The character is bursting through the masque of his alter ego. It is precisely on the stage that Hosanna stops seeming and becomes a man anew. The following speech reveals the conscious decision Hosanna made to regain herself:

...j'me sus dit: 'Cleopatre est un gros tas de marde! Elisabeth Taylor est un gros tas de marde! Tu l'as voulu, ton gros tas de marde Hosanna-de-Saint-Eustache, ben le v'là, ton gros tas de marde!...j'étais pus Cleopatre, cibole, j'étais Samson! Oui, Samson! Pis j'ai toute démoli mes décors en papier mâché! J'savais pas que vous m'haissiez tant que ça...Chus t'un homme,

Cuirette! Si j'me sus sauvée, Cuirette, c'est parce que chus pas une femme...Va falloir que tu t'habitues à ça, aussi...¹¹ (Act II)

The present body, the masque, didn't hold. Samson, the symbol of virility and vulnerability, (the male), won the day as he tore down the pillars that supported Hosanna's ephemeral world. It was not the woman Hosanna, the illusion, who saved Claude from the nihilism of her existence. It was Claude, the man, the habitual body who rescued himself from the ravages of the illusion.

The tragedy of characters like Hosanna, Enrico IV, and the Director¹² lies in their attempt to concretise what is in continuous flux. Their roles are forever changing: a way of coping with the unliveable realities stored in their memory. We, the audience, learn through these characters that the masques we devise for ourselves are temporary and fleeting as reality itself. "Masks, masks... A puff of wind and they ¹³pass and make way for others." Pirandello's wisdom seems the only feasible reality.

The masque is a reasoned accommodation to a situation where truth, albeit its relative nature, is not a possibility. Our memory, where our "truths" are lodged, does not supply us with the mechanisms necessary to create the veneer under which we may hide our unliveable reality. Modern theatre dissects this phenomenon. The age-old adage that the world is a stage is sublimated into our collective memory, making it quasi-automatic for us to find refuge in performance. The fragmented nature of our memory and the uneasy alliance between our habitual body and our present body vitiate our performance, however. Our efforts in concretising and expressing ourselves fold themselves into our memory and so the process becomes part of the result making us both the creators and the main characters of our own mythology.

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Endnotes

1. Bergson's idea of *durée* surfaces here.
2. As does Pirandello's *Enrico IV*. Once awakened from his "madness" he consciously dons the robes of the king in order to "fit" into his present illusion.
3. Hosanna refers to herself in the feminine throughout the play.
4. It is important to note that Hosanna wishes to imitate Elizabeth Taylor imitating Cleopatra. This event illustrates that here we are dealing with mimesis and not becoming. What impedes Claude in becoming Hosanna (and thus Elizabeth Taylor) is his body which cannot become female regardless of the efficacy of the masque in creating the illusion.
5. Of course, we refer to Pirandello's *Enrico IV* and Lorca's *The Public*.
6. While Claude is still disguised as Hosanna, his lover, Cuirette, mistakingly addresses him by his masculine name. Claude's retort is very poignant: "J'm'appelle *Hosanna*".
7. Bruce Wilshire. *Role Playing and Identity*. p.43.
8. Hosanna's coquettish nature brings her ridicule and reprimand from Cuirette.
9. Here one can easily draw a comparison between Canada (the habitual body) unable to accommodate Québec (the present body) who is the object of desire. As such, it is placed opposite the subject and, consequently, can never be assimilated.
10. Symbolically, Hosanna is struggling to get out of her gown and her dead-end situation. She finds her appearance as part man and part woman ridiculous. Her speech is a very succinct summary of the two identities which assail her.
"Chus ridicule quand chus déguisée en homme...Puis chus ridicule quand chus poignée comme ça entre les deux, avec ma tête de femme, pis mon corps...."
(I am ridiculous when I am disguised as a man...And I am ridiculous when I am skewered like this between the two, with my female head and my body....) My translation.
11. "I told myself: 'Cleopatra is a big heap of shit. Elizabeth Taylor is a big heap of shit. You wanted it your big heap of shit, Hosanna-from-Saint-Eustache, well, there you have it your big heap of shit...I was no longer Cleopatra, damn it, I was Samson! Yes, Samson! And I took down all my decors in papier mâché. All of you have demolished my papier mâché life! I didn't know you all hated me so much...I'm a man...If I have saved myself, Cuirette, it's because I am not a woman. You're going to have to get used to that, too.... (My translation.)"
12. *Enrico IV* and the Director/Enrique both reach the conclusion that it is impossible to carry an illusive identity convincingly at all times. At one point the masque becomes too heavy an ordeal. The present body is not integral or concrete enough to withstand the efforts of the habitual body to regain itself.

Quest for Altruism

Ethic Beyond Biology, Economics and Theology

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Abstract

In this article I argue against a too loose nowadays usage of the term altruism. Since its introduction into the domain of biology as a technical term, it has lost a great deal of its ethical meaning—which, to be true, had been disputed even before, by philosophers of the Hobbesian stream. Arguments herein are produced first in order to detach altruism from manipulatedness, reciprocity and kin selection, which are three large domains in the present-day biological thought. If, further on, altruism is to be freed of any additional doubts about its ethical value it also has to transcend the sphere of economics, and finally the one of theology as well.

Introduction

Ever since antiquity in western civilization there has been much talk about ethical attitude towards other human beings. Yet the term *altruism* was not used until around 1830, when it was introduced by Auguste Comte. In his *Systeme de la politique positive* (1854) he defined it as attachment to fellow-people, respect for them, and a positive, good attitude towards the mankind (Sruk 1986, p. 27). Confucianism, however, had been using the term *zhu*, which bore a much similar meaning to the above-described one, more than two thousand years before that (Hribar 1988, pp. 140-146). Altruism itself—not as a name but as a phenomenon—had surely been known longer, still. Moreover, it might had existed even before the time when it could have possibly been observed—at least by the human mind¹.

On the other side there exists nearly as powerful a tradition in the stream of the philosophical thought, which contradicts the former entirely. It was thoroughly elaborated by Thomas Hobbes (1651/1987) and expressed in his famous statement about *bellum omnia contra omnes* and in the outcoming conviction that there was no such phenomenon as altruism²; but one can trace back its origins down to Greek sophists or even further—in a similar way as was the case with the formerly described stream.

A new scientific purview was made possible by the advent of the era of Darwinism. By the first glance this evolutionary theory seemed to support

¹Namely, there are certain proposals from the area of philosophy of biology, to equal life and cognition (Heschl 1990)—which, if accepted, would lead us to adopt evolutionary epistemology (Wuketits 1990), and would also undermine our statement above that implies the difference between existence and being observed.

²Words were different—since altruism as a term did not exist—but the meaning was as it goes.

the latter hypothesis, the one of pure and universal egoism, since it was introducing such terms as *the struggle for existence* or *the survival of the fittest*. Many followers of the Darwinian thought actually and literally believed in those rules up to the point of bringing them into the position of the only proper ones for the human society as well. Such ruthless forms of that political attitude known as social Darwinism were readily accepted by some representatives of—what they themselves believed to be—the social classes consisting of the fittest individuals. Yet it is a rather well known fact that even Darwin himself was not one of those believers. Even though he was the first man to prove the nonexistence of divine intervention in the course of evolution of life, he on the other hand never stopped concerning the questions of morality. Contrary to the rough-side interpretation³ of the social-Darwinist thought he was apt to believe that altruistic individuals were actually the fittest ones, since a) they could mutually increase their survival rate by helping one another; and b) they were taking altruistic care of their offspring, which surely resulted in the promotion of their own hereditary substance (Darwin 1859, 1871/1992). These two statements have subsequently grown into two major sustainers of nowadays biological theories of altruism⁴.

Even though, due to the overwhelming successes of the reductionist paradigm in science, in the 20th century there has not been so much of a natural-scientific attention paid to the questions of morality as had been the case in the previous century, there were some individual authors who continuously worked on them. Some were of the opinion that morality, while admittedly not being a supernatural phenomenon, still contained some features that could not be adequately explained only through the known mechanisms of nature (Huxley 1899, Dobzhansky 1962, Stent 1980). Others were convinced that there was no other morality besides *the morality of the gene*—meaning that every single move of any living organism on the surface of the Earth, including the most complex forms of human behavior, was just on the mission of producing more DNA (Monod 1969, Wilson 1975, 1978, Barash 1979).

At a certain point, in the midst of such mutually opposing theories the term altruism emerged once again. This time it was no more a name for something that was in its greatest part moral, as much as it, indeed in a perfectly technical way, stood for a certain kind of animal behavior (Hamilton

³Some modern interpretations (Kaye 1986, pp. 23-33) of social Darwinism, on the contrary, claim that the core of it (Spencer 1893, Sumner 1963) was actually benign already at that time, in the same way as it can be explained today or as it had been done by Darwin himself. In this light the fittest would no more be those who are the roughest and the most egoistic but something quite opposite: the most cooperative ones, the 'nice guys'.

⁴The former has developed into the theory of reciprocal altruism, and the latter into the theory of kin selection; both of them we will discuss later on.

1963). It finally grew to become a technical biological term in its own right and with its own specific meaning. According to it, an entity is said to be altruistic if it has the effect of promoting the welfare of another entity, at the expense of its own welfare (Dawkins 1981/1990, p. 284). No question about the purpose of such a behavioral act enters the definition of this, what we now call *biological altruism*; which has thus nothing much to do with the everyday, namely ethical meaning of the term—at least a great majority of modern non-mystical philosophers would agree on this point⁵. Following this line of thought we would come to the logical conclusion that the two meanings of the term altruism are simply independent of each other; that biological altruism has no right to appear in the discourse of ethic, and vice versa. This would indeed be so if we were not to ask ourselves the following question: are nature and ethic actually two worlds with just no territory in common, or is it that the latter has emerged out of the former at a certain stage in the course of evolution? Since we are provided with a strong evidence in support of the latter possibility, i.e., with the very fact of our existence, which is both ethical and evolutionary, we are bound to observe altruism in one piece. In principle there should not be any radical differences between the biological and ethical meaning to start with, since ethic itself is nothing else but extension of nature—unless proven otherwise. What may eventually emerge along this path of thought is that a certain behavioral act either fits both definitions of altruism or it should not be regarded as altruistic at all.

Altruism Beyond Manipulatedness

Taking the biological definition of altruism thoroughly in consideration, some authors have logically come to the point of including the manipulatedness in it as well (Dawkins 1981/1990, p. 57, Alexander 1974, Ridley and Dawkins 1981, Ridley 1986, pp. 194-198). Namely, in terms of that definition host's relation to the parasite would righteously be called altruistic, even though the previously existing mere irrelevance of purpose has now grown to become a sharpened paradox: according to this claim, the host is behaving altruistically not just regardless of his own motives (conscious or unconscious) but in complete opposition to them. The subject that performs an action has thus become entirely uninteresting, since it represents nothing more than just a tool for achieving selfish goals of some other entity. Some authors have come to the ultimate and somehow logical proposal that there might simply exist no altruism; that there is just manipulation of signal-receiver by signal-sender (Dawkins and Krebs 1978).

⁵Zhuang Zi, for instance, was of an entirely different opinion, claiming that there were not many things that spoiled the human personality as much as did the performing of good deeds with a purpose.

This statement, however, is wrong⁶. Not only there exist two other well-known forms of biological altruism, i.e., reciprocal altruism and kin-selected altruism, which by their very definitions in no way enter the area of manipulation and manipulatedness; but there is also much common-sense evidence about various kinds of everyday behavior of human beings that is not convincingly explainable just by the use of an ingenuous invention of all-pervasive manipulation. For the time being it may still be just more or less a matter of personal belief, whether one either admits (or at least allows for) the existence of pure altruism or he is unconditionally inclined to reduce it down to one or the other (i.e., psychological or genetical, as we shall see) type of selfishness; but the problem concerning the relation between the subject and the object involved in the act we are paying attention to is not in the least so equivocal. If an entity behaves entirely as means for some other entity's goal-achieving, it can not be considered a subject at all, and therefore, it can neither be regarded as actively performing an act of altruism nor can it be given the attribute of an altruist. On the other hand, in the case when the level of its significance as a subject in its own right is increased, the entity gains the substance needed to become considered a subject and eventually as an altruist as well. In the latter case it must of course have shown its own activity in performing acts of altruism.

Manipulated altruism is a hollow, self-contradictory term. Parasitism, just like any other form of manipulation, has thus no direct influence on altruism. In a sense, it brings even a contrary effect: if there is much manipulatedness in a certain relationship, there is accordingly less room for altruism—since the resources of the giving-party are certainly limited. Something similar goes for the cases where manipulation is only intended by the manipulative party but opposed by the entity central to our attention (which, if never before, at the very moment of its renounce to manipulatedness, becomes a subject): the room for giving out of its free will has now been narrowed, at least in some respects⁷.

There are, however, two indirect or collateral connections between parasitism and altruism. One is that some ectoparasites by their mere existence induce certain acts of their hosts' social behavior in order to get rid of the former—the hosts mutually take parasites out of the areas of another

⁶The existence of sound logical reasoning by itself does not necessarily bring sound results. Namely, data upon which the reasoning has been based can be wrong, ill-selected, or simply irrelevant for the case.

⁷The opposing thesis would certainly be the following: those who refuse to be manipulated but still perform the act of altruism, only this time out of pure generosity, have in fact even increased the area of possibilities to behave altruistically. This would show on two levels: 1) out of the manipulator's attempt they get more objective information about his real needs; and 2) a whole new dimension of possible altruism opens in front of one at the moment he is demanded to deny his ego in such a radical way that goes even beyond the 'golden rule'. But there is already a great deal of mysticism in such a statement.

organism's skin that are difficult to reach by oneself—and the technical name of that behavior is found under the name of *reciprocal altruism*. The second collateral connection to parasitism exists in the field of another type of altruism, namely the *kin-selected altruism*. It has been suggested and also experimentally confirmed that groups, consisting of highly related and therefore also immunologically more uniform individuals—and kin selection doubtlessly promotes such states—are at a higher risk to become heavily invaded (Shykoff and Schmid-Hempel 1991). Having introduced both remaining types of biological explanation of altruism, we now move to them, one at the time—and not just in order to present them, but to transcend them as well.

Altruism Beyond Reciprocity

The recession of the ethical value of the overall term of altruism, already caused by the appearance of the biological part of its meaning, and additionally emphasized by the above-described entry of manipulatedness into the discourse, was still augmented by the inauguration of the new compound term *reciprocal altruism* (Trivers 1971). In a very similar way to the one involving the previously considered term the following statement can be proposed. Besides the ethical weakness the term bears, it also suffers from a still heavier one, namely from the semantical and logical handicap known as *contradictio in adiecto*. Philosophers readily accepted the content of the term but gave it a completely different, indeed a proper name: the *enlightened self-interest*. According to some authors studying this concept, whatever act of apparent altruism a living being performs, it can be traced down to the performer's ultimate expectation of being paid back. The payoff may be proximate or far remote in future, as well as the expectation may be conscious or unconscious, and be either fixed to the specific benefit-bearer or rather general⁸.

Evolutionary biologists have been elaborating their models of this so-called reciprocal altruism on a large scale and with a special concentration on the Prisoner's Dilemma⁹, one of the games belonging to the game theory (Maynard-Smith 1974, Axelrod 1984). Finally, in the majority of the present-day biological textbooks concerning altruism this form is included as an important part of the phenomenon (Ridley 1986, pp. 190-194, Richards 1987,

⁸Some extensions of reciprocity are going to be furtherly discussed in the chapter about economics. Indeed, with the definition above, we have already moved into the area belonging to both fields.

⁹It may be worth mentioning that there is a major difference between the iterated form of it and the one that occurs as a single event. The former is basic for any type of strategy being built up to be involved in reciprocation. The latter, however, is devoid of any such experiential process: everything happens just once. Thus, it is nearer to both clear theoretical analysis on the one side and ethic beyond reciprocity on the other.

pp. 234-246, Alcock 1993). Since it is inconvenient to speak in terms of the enlightened self-interest when one wants to emphasize exactly the other face of the same phenomenon, the cooperative one; but in order to avoid the misleading term of reciprocal altruism on the other hand—some other authors have been using the third term *cooperation* instead (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Axelrod 1984, May 1987), and it well serves its purpose. Actually it is an utmostly reasonable alternative coming as a solution to the enterprise of removing the term altruism from the area of reciprocity, to which it does not belong—nor has it ever really belonged. Therefore, we should introduce a firm limit between altruism and reciprocity: either is an act altruistic or it is speculating¹⁰, in the sense of expectation of being paid back. There is no such thing as reciprocal altruism.

One consequence of this statement could be sound: in any further discourse there should not appear the self-contradictory term of reciprocal altruism any more; just as it should happen to the previously discussed term of manipulated altruism.

However, there may appear some new fuss about the old question, introduced already by Hobbes, regarding the very essence of altruism. Namely, if we agree to try and separate altruism from reciprocity, there should exist firm criteria for classification of an act into one or the other group—but these criteria have not yet existed. Some present-day authors (Richards 1987, p. 242, Alcock 1993, pp. 541-542) suggest examples of pure altruism—like anonymous donation to an anonymous recipient, or similar. But even in those cases one can never tell whether it has not been done out of some collateral motives, like evil-conscience or even fear of God. The term altruism thus becomes very evasive, and finally we might become forced to admit that there is nothing but just an ever-open question whether such a phenomenon as altruism exists at all. Yet that does not in the least change the fact about the non-existence of reciprocal altruism.

However, I propose a more firm criterion upon which to separate reciprocity from the further discourse in altruism. If a certain act is performed with some direct expectation of being repaid, than we are dealing with reciprocity; in the opposite case it is a contender for altruism. 'Direct expectation' is being defined as either a conscious state of mind, or a mechanistic one that leads towards any kind of a consistent behavioral strategy capable of discriminating between the other individual's cooperation and defection.

¹⁰Throughout the text this term is used exclusively in the sense of expectation of some gain. Its difference from another word, economics, which is also going to be abundantly used here is that the former is supposed to indicate the subjective side of what can objectively be called economics. Additionally, at a certain point speculation can go beyond the limits of economics—as we shall see.

On the other hand, if the expectation is just implicit, according to this new criterion we are already dealing with another problem: the one of economics. By pushing some parts into the domain of economics we have made a clear distinction between reciprocity and the contender for altruism; but the distinction between economics and altruism remains to be brought about. Yet, before we move to that transbiological area, we first have to look at one remaining field that belongs to biology.

Altruism Beyond Kin Selection

The modern evolutionary thought has been greatly influenced by the theory of kin selection (Maynard Smith 1964), which introduced the notion of *inclusive fitness* as a rule by which evolution operates, instead of seeing its influence on separate organisms and their individual fitnesses as being central to its course. In plain words, the inclusive fitness of an individual means his own fitness plus his effect on the fitness of his relative or relatives in question, weighed by the coefficient of relationship¹¹ between the individual and his relative(s) (Hamilton 1964).

An individual can act detrimentally towards his own individual interest while at the same time still promoting his inclusive fitness. Such an act of altruism can occur in case when more than two of his brothers or more than four of his half-brothers, etc., happen to depend upon that act—provided that costs for the individual and benefits to the recipient side are about equal. It can also occur even in more distantly related individuals, but only if there are many of them, simultaneously depending on the act of the individual in concern, or if the benefits to them by far outweigh the cost to the subject. The general formula describing this is: $C < SrB$ (C = cost to the individual; B = benefit to the receiver; and r = relatedness between them).

This theory was additionally supported by the selfish-gene theory, which claims that evolution operates at the level of active biological replicators or so-called selfish genes (Dawkins 1976/1990). A replicator or a gene in its terms is not defined in the sense of any existing molecular definition¹². Instead, all copies of a certain nucleotidic sequence in the universe correspond to one selfish gene. Even though we can usually find millions of copies of a certain nucleotidic sequence in various cells within the individuals as well as among members of the larger units, by this definition there we

¹¹Coefficient of relationship, r , between monozygous twins has the value of 1; between parents and offspring as well as between brothers and sisters its value is 0,5; and through every further generation it is logically reduced by half, still.

¹²What is both interesting and paradoxical, troubles in this field have so far only been increasing, due to several new discoveries in the very area of molecular genetics (e.g., the discovery of genes with various functions besides just the classical one of coding for polipeptides; the discovery of split genes; and of transposable elements in the genome). So these molecular definitions are themselves quite ambiguous.

have only one gene present—as long as there has not occurred any mutation or recombination at the intragenic level.

In both these neo-Darwinian theories there can be found certain conceptual weaknesses, which are discussed elsewhere (Jerman and Stern 1996). The replicator has been shown to be an abstract pattern without any potency of act (Settle 1993, pp. 78-79, Jerman and Stern 1996). If the gene is rendered inefficient by the new theory, there must be some other underlying physical entity instead, giving force to the phenomenon of altruism towards kin. In that case the gene would be just the instrument for the promotion of that other entity. For the time being, that is until there eventually appears some crucial evidence about the all-pervading power of some kind of electromagnetic field (Fröhlich 1988, Vitiello 1992) or some other physical entity (Bohm 1982), we can simply go on talking about selfish genes as if they were the motors of life—although it is more and more obvious that this will be nothing more than a temporary metaphor.

The relevant point for the present treatise, however, neither depends on those counter-arguments¹³ nor needs it pay attention to them. It belongs to a different area of argumentation.

If one follows the logic of neo-Darwinian concepts, he comes to the conclusion that the manifestation of altruism should be more and more decreased in proportion to the declining grade of relatedness between the two entities that meet in an altruism demanding situation. This phenomenon was framed within the notion of *the ditches of selfishness* (Stern 1996); since it is not illogical to state that it is not altruism but genetic selfishness what makes an individual, say a mother, take care of her offspring or even sacrifice her life for them. Maternity¹⁴ is in fact the first hidden ditch of genetical selfishness, appearing in the form of the manifest altruism.

Now that we have come to the notion of this extended selfishness, for relations that are equally altruistic at the conspicuous organismic level it would be a logical thing to state that they are more truly altruistic the lower the relatedness between the two individuals in concern. According to this one-dimensional criterion, the one that performs an act of altruism towards non-kin, is more of a pure altruist than the one that does it to his kin. Logically then, who finds an organism genetically most distant from his own

¹³See next footnote for the argument against the common formulation of inclusive fitness.

¹⁴According to the original concept of inclusive fitness there should not be any differences between maternity and paternity, or even between both these on one side and being offspring on the other—since in all these cases and for all directions, $r = 0,5$. Our intuition and experience, however, do not agree with such a conclusion. Of course parents—and mothers surely more so than fathers—are far more concerned about their offspring's well-being than vice versa. And theoretical biology of nowadays does not fail to follow this intuition. Paternity—at least from its biological angle—is unambiguously associated with much less interest in offspring than maternity (Parker, Baker and Smith 1972).

species and acts altruistically towards it, should be named the greatest altruist in the world of living beings¹⁵ (Stern 1996).

No matter how logical these arguments may seem—they do not outweigh our intuitive, common-sense way of reasoning. We would just never admit that an absurd altruist, who gives away as much as his life and even more¹⁶, just for the sake of rescuing an insect or a bacterium, should be called altruist at all—specially in comparison to some others who perform, in our general terms, truly heroic deeds. True enough, science, and also philosophy to quite some degree, should not rely on intuition and common-sense, but on testable facts. Morality, on the other hand, while its teaching (i.e., ethic) is still no less of a philosophical discipline, is also believed to be a matter of *consensus omnium*, and thus submitted, first, to the criticism of even the least important living being from the last corner of the world, and second, to the fact of its ever-lasting development. Ethic is thus found in a strange position somewhere between exactness and arbitrariness. The same then goes for pure altruism—since we, again *ex consensu*, consider it the very core of ethic. There do exist some more or less exact and objective criteria by which altruism can be measured (e.g., the relative value of what has been sacrificed, to the performer—the ‘sacrificial altars of altruism’; or the degree of a psychological barrier he has had to overcome—the ‘enemies of altruism’ (Stern 1996)); however, there can occur so many new and complex situations where there are too many dimensions to be included in the calculation about what is right and what is wrong, that one can rely on no more but his own conscience, operating mainly on the basis of common sense, emotions, experience, and intuition.

Ditches of selfishness, specially the distant ones, show the whole absurdity of a reductionist approach towards a general, irreducible issue, such as ethic surely is. Instead of getting a scientific answer to the question about the gradation of altruism, one finally gets in a position to exclaim something almost like *credo, quia absurdum*; what reveals quite an opposite outcome from the intended, namely a totally mystical one¹⁷.

The other side of the same coin—this notion of the ditches of selfishness—however, ceases to be just a parody of the narrowly rationalistic and utterly counterintuitive approaches to ethic, and brings about a powerful argument

¹⁵That would, however, not be the end of the story. There might as well appear some even greater altruist, who would perform his deeds for the good of non-living matter, of pure ideas, or even for the good of nothingness (Stern 1996).

¹⁶Some values, like code, faith, or honor, can be more precious than ones own life (Stern 1996). Unless they are results of manipulation from outside, they deserve to remain in the discourse.

¹⁷I'm not saying that mysticism can not or should not be an even important part of ethic. The only point I want to make is that the approach which claims to be scientific can not fulfill its own criteria by entering the mysticism.

by which we should feel obliged to rule an entire section of behavior out of the name of pure altruism—in a similar way as we have done in the previous two sections. Namely, any kind of an act of manifest altruism, to which the real underlying force is genetic selfishness, may not be treated as altruism at all. In a sense, there exists no such thing as kin-selected altruism; or we would again find ourselves in the trap of contradiction in terms as it has happened in the cases of manipulatedness or reciprocity facing the altruism. Some may argue that there is no such contradiction here at all, since the phenomena are being observed at two different levels. Selfishness exists only at the genetic level; but at the level of organisms there we may have just altruism and nothing else. The counter-argument would be: the endeavor here is to eliminate from the discourse any kind of behavior that shows even the smallest shade of non-altruistic basis; and ultimately to see if anything has remained—if it has, *that* could eventually be called pure altruism. Other authors may use the term altruism in their own and much less restricted way, as it has been done so far and on a large scale, especially since Hamilton's introduction of the technical meaning of the term. What we are concerned with here, however, is pure or genuine altruism beyond any possible reproach. At first sight it may indeed look like a quixotic battle against the windmills, if we are about to demand the change of the already affirmed term altruism in the biological discourse—since it has gained its 'critical mass': thousands of scholars have adopted it. Yet—as Aristotle said something in the fashion: Plato and Socrates *are* my friends, but still more important is the truth (Bani~ 1990, p. 33)—we can also find enough intuitive moral strength to claim the following. It is not enough just to be explicit about, and consistent in, one's own usage of the term, as some authors would subscribe to (Wilson 1992). In order to remain true to the highest level of ethic I can see no other possibility than to renounce to the biological meaning of altruism, to call it maybe *caring* or *genetically inclusive behavior*, and to spare the name for the pure moral value—if there is such.

Namely, the question appears, whether after this radical argument there exists such a phenomenon as altruism at all. If we go down to the level of selfish genes, we ultimately have to accept the fact that there is no organism on the planet (and in the known universe) that would not be at least in some degree related to us or to any other living being. This fact should by definition rule out any kind of genuine altruism among living beings. Yet there are a few points against this view.

Parents—at least in human species—do not help their offspring just survive, grow and themselves successfully have as much offspring as possible; which would be no more and no less than what the selfish gene would provide for. A really successful selfish gene should actually give a sharp constraint on any additional favor to offspring, since it would be in its interest that parental resources should go into some more genetical reproduction, to produce additional copies of the gene, instead of paying too

much unnecessary attention to the already existing ones. That, as we know, is not the case with at least one animal population: the nowadays western man. He breeds many fewer children than he could; but towards those he performs much more altruism than would be of genetical necessity.

In addition to this there is the second counter-example. In our world the density of human population is already too high, and if it crosses the limit, it will endanger the whole life on the Earth, including our own species. At the planetary level we are already at the stage where precautions have to be taken in birth-control in order to stop the increase of population-growth. All this is of important relevance to our case. In the early times of the mankind every conspecific organism was precious for any other—speaking in terms of genetics—since they were rare. Self-detrimental behavior¹⁸ could easily appear and be paid-off (in a certain genetical sense within the framework of inclusive fitness) even between relatively more distantly related individuals. Nowadays things have completely changed. If we ignore the cultural influence on our senses (e.g., friendship, compassion, etc.), and reckon only the selfish genes in us, then somebody out of the range of our proximate relatedness is of just no importance to us. That is to say, there is no more genetical foundation to our altruistic attitude towards a member of our species. Even further can we go with the statement: approaching the highest limit or the critical number of human beings on the planet, one would indeed gain by eliminating the concurrents—what would, for once, look at least a little bit like Hobbesian mythical world of egoists.

If the two cases were partly transbiological, the third one is going to be already entirely of that kind. It stems from the human psycho-social experiencing and interpreting of certain events. These two activities often prove to be in complete discordance with the logic of the ditches of selfishness. Let us take an example: a human mother who neglects her children or forgets about them, in order to help some unknown ones, if both are in about the same degree of need, will be considered at least very strange or even as much as mentally deranged person—and what is worth being emphasized: not in the least moral.

Hereby we have thus under three points—which are just a few examples chosen from the intuitive holistic order¹⁹ of what has been metaphorically named *the sands of altruism*²⁰ (Stern 1996)—shown that at least in human

¹⁸Here I use this term instead of the term kin-selected altruism, which had to be abandoned, according to the previous statements.

¹⁹To have used this rather vaguely formulated metaphysical expression does not mean that I had to have recourse to mystifying my claims. The real underlying fact is that the analytical type of discussion about the two faces of our existence—the objective and the subjective one—would go beyond the spatial framework and the scope of the present writing.

²⁰The obvious purpose of this metaphor is to mark the contrast with the one of the ditches of selfishness.

species there exists possibility of there being a phenomenon that would deserve to be called altruism—extending beyond kin selection, as well as beyond the other two, already elucidated, biological constraints on altruism.

Altruism Beyond Economics

In the previous section we have partially already immersed into the domain of culture, so there is not going to occur any jump of a qualitative kind when the discourse proceeds into the sphere that can be defined as transbiological, exosomatic, psycho-social, or simply—cultural²¹ (Medawar and Medawar 1977, pp. 63-64). Neither is there any gap in substance between the debate about reciprocity and the present one. Economics can be at least partially viewed as a certain kind of extension of reciprocity—so much so that it is even difficult to point at any sharp limit between the two. Even if we take the case of an individual who does a certain favor to another one, expecting some remote or even just implicit thankfulness in return, it is already difficult to put it under the simple name of expected reciprocation. It may be more exact to call that behavior economical, since there is nothing that is literally given in return, and yet there exists some kind of a pay-back. The latter comes also from a much vaster range of possibilities, including the ones originating in the other members of population, the 'admirers'—for in a sane population there is surely much more enthusiasm in helping the helpers than in helping the dull and non-cooperative individuals.

And so much more certainly goes the argument about the difficulty of putting a limit between reciprocity and economics, for the case when the doer of good is not even expecting anything—since in that case both phenomena are simply out of range. However, we can never be quite sure whether there is not *some* kind of expectation beneath, be it even subconscious²²—a simple matter of tradition, which automatically promotes eusocial behavior. There are certain views that docility (i.e., receptivity to social influence) is the mechanism that promotes biological evolution of altruism (Simon 1990) and of morality itself (Hayek 1992). There is no mention of conscious activity in either case. Something else appears instead: the link between economics and altruism—the latter being not just the technical neo-Darwinian term any more but to a certain degree a term free of biological constraints, and loaded with sound ethical value.

21The word culture is surely not the best one for the description of a certain non-biological phenomenon (although that is the usual purpose of its use), yet, it is most widely used even in scientific writings (e.g., Fialkowski 1990, Hayek 1992).

22For instance, even if we take highly ethical principles such as Kantian categorical imperative or Christian 'golden rule', we can find an implicit trace of selfishness in both—since their hidden message might also be interpreted as follows: given the fact that you are obviously capable of such pondering, you surely and unavoidably, at least at the theoretical or subconscious level, expect others to behave in the same proper way as you are expected to.

Proceeding with this linkage, ethic itself has been said to be the study of the way of resource-allocation (Hardin 1990, p. 3). Such a view is a modern descendant of the early positivism in ethic, with its representatives like Comte or Bentham; the former being the initiator of positivism in general sense as well as in the domain of ethic, and the latter being known by his famous felicity-calculus. Hume had been even finding components of ethical altruism in such fields as production or trade—emphasizing that people do favors to others without even knowing them or without even wishing that (1739/1886, pp. 289, 296). In this utilitarian stream of thought, ethic is related to economics in a strong way: it as much as grows out of it and thus truly depends on it.

I do agree that there are components of morality nearly everywhere, even in the areas where neither altruism nor goodness have much space to exist—like in military fighting²³ or among gangsters; yet here we discuss another side of morality, and that is the one at which we are in seek of eventual ethical purity of altruism.

First thing to get rid of in order to approach this goal is exactly the economical interest of the performer of the act. Conscious speculating motives, which, on the top of it, belong to the already analyzed level of reciprocity, can easily be detected, and all the acts moved by them—eliminated from the further discourse. Subsequently, the unconscious economical interests, as soon as they eventually and gradually become apparent, can be removed as well. Still, even if they never become conspicuous, we can get rid of them at least at the theoretical level. What remains is then a contender for the name of altruism; and what remains is: all kinds of nonmaterial, spiritual goods.

However, there exists also an extreme view of this area. So far the word economics has been used only in its strict and narrow sense. But if we broaden its meaning by including the nonmaterial psychological component, we come to the point of bringing the term *satisfaction* in. The term means nothing economical in material sense—but something so much more precious in spiritual one. The whole thing ultimately becomes some kind of a paradoxical but very firm economics: the less worthy matter is being sacrificed in order to achieve some higher, immaterial value. In Fromm's language: 'to be' instead of 'to have' (Fromm 1976). By this ultimate criterion, any altruistic deed that is followed by self-appreciation of the performer or even by the slightest sense of his self-fulfillment, should be called economical, and not altruistic.

It is difficult to oppose this seductive appeal, coming from the Hobbesian legacy as well as out of our own logic, which belongs to the modern

²³The emphasis here is on fighting against enemy. The acts of altruism towards comrades (Wilson 1978, pp. 155-156, Richards 1987, p. 244) are not included in this statement.

reductionist way of reasoning, but which drives us right into the *reductio ad absurdum*. The real altruist by this definition would be the one who does not feel the slightest trace of satisfaction following the act; or even better: the one who even regrets it (since that is the sign of even more certain absence of economizing—the phenomenon of course being taken in the broad sense, including the implicitness), but would in any new case still do the same, out of some mysterious internal self-oppressing duty. A mere glance at it from the holistic anthropological or common-sense angle provides us with firm belief²⁴ that these themes simply can not be approached by the—otherwise possibly sound—logic of reductionism. However, there also exists some logically better grounded argument than just this one relying on ideological principle. That is the Kantian claim that in theory (but no way in practice)²⁵ there exist deeds with just no connection to their economical consequences for their performer. So there is no need to bring forth such terms as non-satisfaction or regret in order to diminish the possibility of the performer's economical interest. Moreover, non-satisfaction or regret can be interpreted even as a some remotely perverted kind of masochistic gain, which is surely again economical from the subject's point of view. Thus, the only possibility of ruling out the economical factor is the one that is at the same time the simplest: to postulate its complete dissociatedness from the deeds. In practice, however, this solution may not mean much.

Apart from the now discussed psychological satisfaction as if being a matter of economics, there are certain nonmaterial goods (e.g., fame, power) that can be more righteously viewed as belonging to the domain of economics—the more so due to the fact that they sooner or later indeed turn into material. Regarding the other nonmaterial values, called spiritual—I simply feel reluctant to translate them into the vocabulary of economics—be it either for the theoretical Kantian reason or for the practical common-sense one. That is to say: true altruism, the one searched beyond biological constraints and now—further on—beyond economics, still *has* a possible place of existence.

Altruism Beyond Theology

Theology is the last field from which our central term has to be detached in order to become free of suspicion about having any side-motive or basis elsewhere than in the pure ethic. There are some deeds carried out by people, at which no shade of biology or economics exists²⁶, and yet they still do not

²⁴ The word is supposed to depict a certain lack of analytical philosophical ground of such a postulation.

²⁵ We have to be aware that in Kantian vocabulary the meanings of the *practical* and the *theoretical* are almost entirely reversed. My usage of the terms, however, is standard.

²⁶ This statement can be partially defended in practice, through the methods of observation and introspection (the latter achieving some further results than the former); yet, there is a part of it which is only theoretical.

fulfill the rule just mentioned. Namely, there is some other speculation behind them, which has not been brought forward so far—and that one is the most ethereal calculation possible, the one beyond any form of earthly economics. It is the expectation of godly existence and the consequential possibility of repayment for just any kind of even the most hidden altruistic deed performed by the subject in question. Easily we can thus join the humanistic spiritualists from a few hundred years ago, who were declaring that only an atheist is not in a position completely devoid of possibilities to reach the highest peak of ethic, achievable by man. A similar starting point is made by Levinas, a judaistic philosopher of this century, who states that in order to become an ethical being one has to start from atheism (Levinas 1968). For Judaism itself it is characteristic that god may be equaled with nothingness. In terms of the present essay such a theology is surely the most promising one among all, since it captures the exact idea of not performing any act of altruism while having in mind a goal connected to even the remotest trace of selfishness. Such a theology is of course as much as an atheism—in its brightest sense.

I am not trying to say that world would be better, and maybe not even that it would be more honest (i.e., less hypocritical) without theology. On the contrary: I might agree that the average people behave more cooperatively and with more compassion if they believe in, and are also afraid of, some divine creature above them. But seeking the very summit of ethic, possibly achieved only by some rear individual here and there, one should admit the notion just carried out—the notion of the highest theology (in terms of ethic) being the one that has renounced to existence of god in any sense but in the sense of nothingness. Such a theology outgrows itself to become ethic of altruism beyond theology (Stern 1996).

Conclusion

This quest for altruism has been performed in an unconventional way. Namely, right from the beginning there had already existed both the term and the phenomenon, in fact quite a few versions of the latter; but I was striving to destabilize all the existing meanings. My intention was to point at the weak points of those widely used meanings, in order to come out with the same term of altruism, but finally with completely purified contents. One by one, the increasingly hard constraints were being overcome and the ethical contents of the term liberated to enter the next, until the last one. From the initially altogether practical arguments with firm conclusions about what is not altruism, gradually I had to have recourse to more theoretical arguments that resulted in less practical conclusions. Having crossed the last known border of possible speculation, we have come to the realm of pure ethic; however, this was at the same time already the world of pure theory.

True altruism we have been in search of throughout the essay, has been shown only *per negationem*—we can never really be sure when we see it, but

we can always positively tell whether some act is *not* altruistic. These constraints, however, have to be taken *cum grano salis*, otherwise nothing could ever even contend for altruism, right from the beginning.

In addition, purifying of the term altruism brought about some parallel result concerning ethic itself. The discourse was strictly non-ambitious in the sense of philosophical formulation of *good* as such; one general thing concerning ethic, however, was—at least intuitively—shown to exist: a field that could be called *ethic beyond any moral constraints*. Facing this—what may at first appear to be a tautological statement, yet it has turned out to be far from that—, a radical conclusion can be derived that any other kind of ethic may simply not deserve its name.

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Blood, Death and the End of the Old Order: The Mystery Religion as a Vehicle for Consciousness Transition

M. Sophia Compton

This paper explores consciousness evolution, particularly in terms of the ancient Greek world. Though not actually an examination of cultural evolution, it is worth a moment to gain a long overview of cultural development.

In the Lower Paleolithic, humans were primarily food collectors and hunters of small game; in the Upper Paleolithic, hunting advanced and men began to hunt in teams. Women were primarily the food gatherers. What is a marked difference in these two stages of development, however, was that in the earlier stage there were cult or social festivities, but no blood sacrifice and no form of priesthood. In the latter stage there was animal (blood) sacrifice and mediators between the clan and the local deity (such as a shaman) began to appear. In the Neolithic period (6,000 BCE), humans began to settle down and cultivate the soil. This is when we begin to see a clear emergence of the importance of earth mother deities, to whom many sacrifices were offered.

In terms of religious consciousness, no one would argue that the experience of reality of the magical rituals of the Stone Age was qualitatively different from the experiences of the hunters and gathers with their totems, or the Greeks with their highly stratified mythological hierarchy of gods and goddesses, or the eventual concept of monotheism which developed in most of the world's great religious traditions. From the point of view of the development of human consciousness, these differences point to definite ages, to times when the structures of consciousness were mutating and evolving, hence suffering the concomitant upheaval which marks the demarcation of any significant shift in conscious evolution. According to Gebser, Wilber, and others (1), these stages of consciousness are:

1 .archaic-uroboric, the 'dawning' period of human consciousness wherein humans had no notion of anything beyond immediate experience. In Gebser's words, "It is akin, if not identical, to the original state of biblical paradise: a time when the soul is yet dormant, a time of complete non-differentiation of man and the universe." (2)

2. magical, which may have begun around 200,000 years ago and which included early stages of symbolic thinking and a rudimentary sense of self, but which was dominated by an intimate connection to the horde or clan. This can be compared to a very small child who is still intimately bonded to the parental figure and who has no understanding of the sharp line between reality and imagination. Hence, the world is an extension of the self, which attempts to 'magically' interact with it through psychic connectedness, sympathetic magic, etc: i.e., an elaborate system of associations, wherein "all things and persons are interrelated...a world of pure but meaningful

accident.” (3) Time was not a concept in this stage, but began to make itself felt in the concept of death around 40,000 years ago.

3. mythical, characterized first by the cave paintings in France and Spain and culminating in the classical mythologies of which most of us are aware. This was the age dominated by the Mother Goddess; it also marked the beginnings of agriculture, more elaborate religious symbolism (focusing on sacrifice and fertility), institution of handicrafts, social classes; dominated primarily by imagination rather than rational reasoning. Its essential characteristics are polarity and cycles, and it did not distinguish between sacred and profane time.

4. mental consciousness, with the accompanying intellect’s ability to distinguish between these two kinds of activities,(i.e., sacred and profane) as its capacity for abstraction increases. It is characterized by religion, rather than myth, which is “on one level a matter of memory...and on another level, of feeling (beyond magical emoting) and of social sentiment.” (4)

Consciousness evolution should not be confused with cultural evolution, or the evolutionary perspective which often portrays ‘civilized’ society as an advancement beyond a more ‘primitive barbarism.’ As was noted by Combs and Krippner in a recent examination of this issue:

Gebser himself objected to this idea, probably because he associated evolution with Darwinian competition and survival and of the fittest. He did not consider any structures of consciousness superior to any other. Nor did he see their historical transformations as competitive, but rather as the unfolding of explication of the already inherent potential of the Origin, his term for the spirit. It is true, however, that each successive structure of consciousness represents an incremental jump in complexity over previous ones. (5)

Magical ritual would have been analogous to play, mythical ritual was “psychic participation in the larger life,” wherein consciousness “remembers itself through myth.” (6)

Mental consciousness seeks, through religious practices, to reconnect itself to the larger whole from which it feels separated, since it is characterized primarily by dualism rather than polarity. The ultimate achievement of this dualistic world view is said to be monotheism. Gebser assigns emergence of mental structures to 1225 BCE for Judaism, 500 BCE for Greece and 1250 for medieval Europe. Feuerstein believes that the first stirrings of mental consciousness can be found in human sacrifices to the Mother Goddess and the development of distinct subject-object relations. In the mental stage, we see the full development of ego and a concept of linear progression through time. It is a “new form of consciousness, which no longer only muses but is also fully capable of discursive thought and hence of pointed emotional expression associated with a heightened sense of individuality.” (7)

For the egoic consciousness, death was a uniquely personal event which was the cause of considerable anxiety. It was this concept of death which afflicted the age of transition between the mythological (sometimes called matriarchal) and mental (often called patriarchal) stages, and which was addressed so beautifully by the emergence of the mystery traditions, particularly the Eleusinian Mysteries.

In the concept of the Great Round, which dominated 'matriarchal' or mythical consciousness, belief was centered in the revolution of all of life and nature, which passed in an endless round or wheel from the underworld into the light of day and back again. According to Cornford,

there was no hope or possibility of release, indeed such an idea would have no meaning, since the individual soul did not persist after death, but was reabsorbed into the one life of all things. (8)

The concept of a soul, which is in some sense immortal, was first connected to the group; it was thought to be impersonal, outliving the generation of its members. In Bronze Age Greece this begins to be confounded with individual immortal souls; thus emerges the class of immortals, which does not, however, include the masses. Cornford explains that in the psychology of Homer we find two souls, the psyche (or eidolon, image), and the blood soul that contains the vital powers or mana.

The psyche, which is the recognizable image of the person, escapes from the mouth at the moment of death and may visit the family members in dreams. It should not be confused with our modern use of the term psyche, denoting some kind of psychic whole and which did not develop until after Homer. Rather, this psyche has no 'vital force' in and of itself, when it descends into Hades, the world of shades. The vital force is in the blood soul; its powerful characteristic is force or motion, as opposed to eidolon soul, characterized principally by knowledge. It is this blood soul which resides in the psyche, giving it life. It is only by drinking blood that the eidolon can recover some of its mana, or something resembling consciousness. Thus in ancient literature, it is not uncommon to see the practice of pouring blood on the ground to appease or communicate with the dead. It is this blood soul that resides in the psyche, giving it life.

The more impersonal group soul, connected by blood, is what makes the family different from another clan or house:

It is the transmitted vehicle of hereditary qualities, including the taint of hereditary guilt. It is also a continuum, identified with the blood, which entails collective responsibility: any kinsman may be held accountable for any action of the whole group or of any other kinsman. Hence the blood-feud or vendetta. (9)

If the soul demonstrates that it is angry or seeks vengeance, it becomes an Erinys. The Erinys represent the primeval law, and they "prosecute breach of this law with a 'pitiless heart'—the law of consanguinity." (10) This was an

era that was characterized by an “egolessness in which ones primary sense of identity is with the tribe or group.” (11)

When the tribal communities became agricultural, the focus of religious attention was centered on the earth, or rather that portion of the earth which gave sustenance. There were, of course, early gods and goddesses which preceded Olympianism, but in pre-Olympian days Greece was parceled out among many undifferentiated local fertility cults.

In what Otto calls the ‘earth religion’, death does not separate one from the community of the living—he or she simply dwells in the maternal earth, which is why in ancient Athens the dead were said to belong to Demeter. On festival days, the dead may return to rejoice with their loved ones. The Homeric age, however, saw a shift in belief about the afterlife. The dead do not cease to be, but they are no longer connected to the living or to the gods which now rule in the ‘upperworld’. There is “no longer any connection between the 2 spheres...the gods belong wholly to life...and have nothing to do with the dead...so broad is the interval that separates the Oylmpians from the ancient divinities.” (12)

In the earlier ancestor cults, the spirit of the deceased is often brought back into the community, and there is a tendency to affirm or reinforce the connection between the dead and the clan. Where the dead are separated from society, however, ritual actions are directed toward assisting the soul in its readjustment to the underworld; the return of the dead is not desired, for the departed would only interfere with the social order. Sometimes the survivors spend considerable time and effort to keep the souls of the deceased as happy as possible, so they do not have the desire to return to earth and haunt the living.

In what Otto calls the “holy order of high antiquity” (13) there was a deep reverence for blood and the cycle of life and death; the Erinys are the daimons of the shed blood of their parents; indeed, the earth mother, Rhea, has conceived them from the drops of blood which fell from the castrated Uranus. Mara Keller (14) and others see the tragedy of Aeschylus (where Orestes is guilty of matricide) as decisively contrasting the old religion of the goddess with the newer forms which had evolved since the rise of the Olympians. The Erinys remind us of the old order, which, in the play, is still struggling, even in its death throes. Otto, too, notes that we cannot help but be filled with “horror that these two worlds are in conflict and that their opposition is insoluble.” (15)

Although some have seen the basic dilemma in Orestes trial to be the cultural problem of the evolving Greek patriarchy vs. Myceanean Greece, others see in the Aeschylus story the first recorded jury and a move from ‘blood’ justice to a more impartial one. Gebser observes that “legislation and matricide proceed from the same newly formed consciousness structure.” (16)

He goes on to point out that matricide is synonymous with the end of the matriarchal epoch, which by that time had become deficient.

It is well to note that Gebser uses this word to describe the decline of every epoch, including our own, but for different reasons. And although a feminist complaint could be made about using the word ‘deficient’ to describe the goddess culture of this period, we must acknowledge that the Erinyes are “brute and blind as the will of blood.” (17) Woe to the transgressor who does not respect the holy bond of blood, or worse yet: who takes the life of his own blood, regardless as to whether such a foul deed was committed with evil intent. Oedipus is a case in point.

This zeal in supervising the holy ordinances of Nature, this grim wrath against anyone who fails to respect them, this horrible consistency with which he is brought to a reckoning and retribution is exacted to the last drop of blood, regardless of whether his intentions were honorable or whether he has repented and sues for mercy— this rigorous and menacing character of the elements is sharply and specifically expressed in the Erinyes. (18)

Orestes’ deed is incomparably more grievous because he shed his own blood, whereas Clytemnestra murdered her husband, who was unrelated to her by blood. This is the definitive judgment of the Erinyes. When the new Olympian gods stand opposed to the ancient daimons and earth deities they porcelain a new order, a “psychological differentiation.” (19) The issue is to be tried for the moral worth of the victim. “The Aeschylean tragedy celebrates the institution of the Athenian court for cases of murder, by means of which the law and authority of the state supplants the bloody expiation of the old order.” (20)

It was, of course, Athene who broke the tie and cast the deciding vote. Interestingly the image wherein we see this emergence from mythical polarity most dramatically is in Athene’s bursting forth from the head of Zeus. Zeus, we recall from the myth, has eaten Metis, Athene’s mother, while she was pregnant, and gives birth to Athene by having his head split open with an ax, an event “accompanied by a terrible tumult throughout nature as well as the entire pantheon.” (21) Even the sea, the all embracing Mother-element is in an angry turbulence, and Helios is interrupted in his course across the sky. The great cycle has been rendered asunder, and something new (curiously enough, in a female body and not a male one, as in Gebser’s generic example, below) emerges from the wound.

Gebser interprets this to be an extraordinary event

. . . it bursts man’s protective psychic circle and congruity with the psychico-naturalistic-cosmic-temporal world of polarity and enclosure. The ring is broken and man (sic) steps out of the two-dimensional surface into space, which he will attempt to master by his thinking. This is an unprecedented event, an event that fundamentally alters the world. (22)

The birth of Athene is a “tragic awakening” (23) comparable to the tragedy reflected in the Oresteia. Interestingly, Gebser notes, Orestes rediscovered his sister Iphigenia, who was believed dead, in the sanctuary of Artemis, the archetype, we may add, of the powerful Feminine par excellence.

This discovery of his sister after he had released himself from his maternal attachment may impart a purely humane touch to this tragedy of consciousness emergence. (24)

The Greek hero-myths are symptomatic of the demands and pains made on the culture in its attempt to “bridge the gap rent by matricide” as well as to assert the emerging “egoic” consciousness of the time.(25) This scenario of the Greek heroes, who are “embarrassing because of their boastfulness and exaggeration” reflects the mania of the age in its attempt to deal with the frightening phenomenon of stepping into the “diurnal brightness” of “the solar temple”, represented, of course, by Apollo. Gebser notes, however, that this tendency was balanced by the cults of Demeter, Artemis, and later, the Virgin Mary, which served to offset the dangerous one-sidedness in this onset of the emerging patriarchy.

It is common to see Athene scapegoated in much goddess literature today for being ‘animus-ridden’, i.e., for choosing the side of the patriarchy. However, I think there is a deeper undercurrent which needs to be examined here. Indeed, she does not defend mother-right; she is not a goddess of procreation, she is the goddess of the creative arts. Athene, we must acknowledge, does not embody the feminine, nurturing, receptive qualities of the mother, qualities which are, in my mind, stereotypical. Christine Downing has been bold enough to explore the meaning of Athene’s true nature in her book, *The Goddess: Mythological Images of the Feminine*:

She has escaped the agony of coming to believe that creation and femininity are incompatible that has so deeply affected many women. [She is] the goddess most identified with the work of civilization the works that express our humanity. Athene’s art is the art made within and for the human community. She represents a being with that fosters mutual creativity that is based on soul and spirit rather than instinct and passion. (27)

She is thus a very vital feminine figure who helps to bridge this inevitable shift in ages. The image of the owl represents her “spirit of brightest vigilance” which “seems to suggest the bringing of soul back to the upper air.” (28)

Athene represents the spirit of the heroic ego who integrates experiences as a unique and free-thinking individual.

In the period when the Eleusinian Mysteries emerged as the mystery initiation par excellence (600-400 BCE), humankind was in a time of tremendous upheaval and transition; the human being had “stepped out of the shelter of the group which previously surrounded and protected him like

a cave...(the) group spirit attained a kind of awareness of itself for the first time...it began to act and separate and in this separation placed the ego outside of itself.” (29) This resulted, of course, in the dichotomy between matter (body) and consciousness (soul/spirit). If psyche had become external, then the body was perceived as the soul’s tomb, which is what developed in Platonic philosophy. Here, the mystery cults can be seen as a positive effort of consciousness to come to terms with the psychic legacy of its past.

The transition from mythical to mental consciousness, according to Gebser, was marked by transition of a plurality of presences (the earth-spirits or ghost spirits) to a single, transcendent deity, which was revered and graced with thanksgiving. This was accompanied by the development of the ego and its accompanying ideas of a single soul housed within the body of an individual, as opposed to the mana, or vital essence of the living, or the mana of the dead.

The mystery religions were instrumental in this developmental process. Jane Harrison believes that, in general, the idea of mysteries appears “in relation to the cult of women divinities.” (30) That is, they first evolved from the earth mother goddesses (such as Demeter), not the Olympian (sky) deities. So one function of the mystery religion was to integrate the developing mental consciousness with the preceding structures of consciousness, the magical and the mythical. But whereas Gebser sees the Dionysian cult to be based on the dualistic conception of the body/spirit, and therefore reflective of the emerging mental consciousness, Feuerstein observes that the Dionysian revelries are interpreted by many to contain regressive elements. He quotes Gerald Heard:

By drunkenness the self-conscious man was able to sink again under the ‘limen’ of the subconscious. Dissociation was induced by alcohol and dancing.
(31)

It was, however, the “true mystery religions” which offered the opportunity to combine religious experience with the “light of reason.” (32) The Eleusinian Mysteries, as well as the others prevalent in classical Greece were, of course, still clothed in mythology. It is no longer the purely imaginative element of the mythical structure, however, which imbues the initiate, but the conceptualizations which underlie it and which the initiation itself reveals. “It was this knowledge which was given to initiates of the mystic cult in the form of unspoken words” (33) which offered the opportunity to transcend the fear of death. This apparently provided the Greek mystery initiate with an entirely different way of perceiving the afterlife than was prevalent in the previous cults of the dead.

Gebser perceived the Demeter-Persephone mysteries to underscore the matriarchal aspect, which of course it does, because of the basic polar structure of the mother-daughter pair. However, the symbol of the narcissus is representative of the soul in a “process of conscious emergence...(and in a

process of integrating what is today....called the ‘unconscious’” (34), i.e., represented by Persephone’s descent to the underworld.

For Gebser, what is fundamental to the structure of mental consciousness is the emergence of directed or discursive thought. Whereas mythical thinking was a “shaping or designing of images in the imagination which took place within the confines of the polar cycle, discursive thought...is no longer polar-related, but rather directed toward objects and duality, creating and directing this duality, and drawing its energy from the individual ego.” (35)

By the time of the classical Greek era, the Eleusinian Mysteries aptly provided the needed link from its older form of the fertility/polarity cult to its newer form (still distinctly feminine) characterized by the assimilation of this emergence of mental consciousness and individuation. Burkert noted that that mysteries “are a form of personal religion, depending on a private decision and aiming at some form of salvation through closeness to the divine.” (36) The Olympian gods, although immortal, came to seem precariously human in temperament, at least to be seen as divinities to the more individuated person. We see a related dissatisfaction with the Yahweh figure by Gnostics in their own cults in the early part of the common era. The underworld, once a home before consciousness perceived the sky to delineate its new boundaries, was no longer a place where the divine dwelled. It was only the abode of the dead. Private initiation “with its emphasis on the discovery of the individual” (37) was offered as a hope for the “blessedness” of the afterlife. What the initiate was “shown” by the hierophant on the mystery night was that “death is not only not evil, but a good.” (38) There is a rejoicing in the act of living, but the emphasis “is indeed on the other side.” (39)

The initiations created uncommonly close bonds between participants who not only were unrelated by blood, but who may have been complete strangers. Symbolic communities were joined by a shared myth, as opposed to literal communities or clans joined by blood. Joan Engelsman suggests that:

The popularity of these new cults created a religious revival which emphasized personal salvation by means of mysterious and hidden knowledge communicated at the time of initiation. (40)

Although we “only have a faint idea of what Platonic Eleusis” was about, (41) we know that it was no longer fashionable to suppose that the elements, e.g., earth and water, were divine in themselves. Instead of plain nature, “metaphysics in the wake of Plato is made the reference system...the movement toward generation is thus interrupted and the return to higher origins is made to start.” (42)

The souls’ home is now in the stars, and although Persephone descends into the underworld, her initiation and birth experience is marked by a profoundly transcendental image: she is the mother who gives birth in fire,

not from the watery womb. Demeter, too, subjects her adopted child to the flames, and the child in the fire is burned, we recall from the myth, so that it may become immortal. What is significant to me is that as the rites celebrating the Demeter-Persephone story continued to evolve, the symbols used to portray agrarian themes were metaphorically reinterpreted in terms of immortality.

In the Eleusinian Mysteries initiation was not prescribed by clan or family and it was open to all regardless of social status. These symbolic communities were joined by a shared myth, not by shared blood. As blood ties gave way to a more abstract sense of justice and relatedness, these symbols became images of transcendence, a transcendence of the bonds of the clan.

A special kind of experience was expected from the Eleusinian Mysteries, one that produced a powerful change of consciousness. A ritual was observed that created a “sympatheia of souls...some form of resonance which...once it is there will deeply move or even shatter the constructs of reality.” (43) The soul is now of the same substance as the divine.

Eleusis meant arrival and according to Kerényi (44) implied not only coming into the world, celebrated by the re-discovery of Kore at Eleusis, but also a second coming, i.e., it was said of the initiates that they had “arrived” at some special kind of knowledge, some special understanding about life that was qualitatively different from the uninitiated. Eleusis, it was said, was the “place of birth, of that ever re-current cosmic event which guaranteed the continuance of life.” (45) In the words of the classic Lesbian poet, Krinagoras, the initiate will pass through the portal of death “with a lighter heart” (46). Engelsman (47) believes that the growth and popularity of the mystery cults was of singular importance for the continued development of the feminine divine. It was a time when the goddess was being envisioned as moving into unprecedented territory psychically.

Changes in consciousness are nonetheless painful, as many in our own age have noted. Richard Tarnas believes that the lost ‘participation mystique’ resembles the original archetypal situation of birth trauma:

Here is the painful separation from the timeless all-encompassing womb of nature, the development of human self-consciousness, the expulsion from the Garden, the entrance into time and history and materiality, the disenchantment of the cosmos, the sense of total immersion in an antithetical world of impersonal forces. (48)

That egoic consciousness moved on to separate itself from an embedded relationship with nature, life, and the other structures of consciousness (the magical and mythical) is a loss to be mourned. Likewise, it is dangerous and exceedingly sad that ‘enlightened reason’ has sought to suppress the feminine principle through anathematizing the psychic dimension, emotivity and the body itself. We are left with a history marked by an erosion of indigenous

lifestyles and a triumph of the secular, not to mention assault on planetary life forms, both human and nonhuman.

We are indeed in our own period of transition, heightened by a severe sense of anomie and anxiety that probably has never characterized any previous age so profoundly. To quote Gebser:

The same dread and horror which once overshadowed mutation from the mythical to the mental, as manifest in the matricide of the Oresteia, are amassing through out the world during our present transitional epoch. (49)

The possibility that we will discover mysteries to save us today remains to be seen.

Endnotes

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27. Christine Downing, *The Goddess: Mythological Images of the Feminine* (N.Y.: Crossroad, 1981), pp. 114-119.
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37. Ibid., p.11.
38. Ibid., 21.
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42. Ibid.
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45. Ibid., p. 200
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Gebser Reprogrammed: Suppose An Emerging Cyber Consciousness

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Abstract

Gebser's vision of an emerging integral consciousness may well have been the product of his own mental/rational grand theory. A child of his time (as are we all) he wrote before witnessing the effects of television and the computer, the Web/Internet, virtual communities and virtual identities, the rise of the information society, and post-modernity. Drawing on insights from Marshall McLuhan, Howard Rheingold, Paul Virilio, Arthur Kroker, and the consciousness brain/mind theories of Marvin Minsky and Daniel Dennett, perhaps instead of the integral we can posit an emerging cyber consciousness of virtual realities and virtual identities, cyborg-like machinic bodies, technological extensions, and hyper-experiences of instantaneity and virtual space. Instead of the integral's Picasso, for an image of this emerging consciousness we might well turn to the cybernovel *Neuromancer*.

In the opening pages of William Gibson's classic cybernovel *Neuromancer*, we learn how Case, the novel's hero, spent much of his time "jacked into a custom cyberspace deck that projected his disembodied consciousness into the consensual hallucination that was the matrix."¹ His consciousness is merged into the matrix, into that massive electronic field that Case had been neurologically modified to experience as a real physical space.

More striking is the experience of Dixie McCoy, one of Case's former teachers, who flatlined—died—(they refer to him as the flatliner) and now exists only as a ROM construct within the matrix. His consciousness exists in the electrical potentials and flows of computer chips.

My title says—let us suppose. . .

So now let us suppose that what if instead of Gebser's vision of an integral consciousness, what is emerging is something he couldn't have foreseen at the time he wrote—a cyber consciousness.

We are all children of our times. Gebser too. Those who heard my earlier papers know that I have a difficulty—a Lyotardian, Foucauldian, postmodern difficulty—with Gebser's sweeping master narrative, his totalizing, universalizing grand metatheory. Even while I salute the enormous effort he put into his project, I think he much too much massaged his data. It's all too neat, too coincidentally perfect. Structures trace their trajectories from zero through one, two, three and four dimensions, from none and pre- through unto a-perspectivals. Everything fits into its proper place in the categorical tables.² We must be suspicious of such order.

(And while we can credit Gebser with giving us useful categories for speaking about modes of thinking, let's not forget that categories

domesticate, limit our thinking and perceptions, lull us into mistakenly believing that things fall neatly under our controlling analyses.)

Often when reading such detailed systems I'm reminded of something I read long ago in psychologist Robert Lindner's *The Fifty Minute Hour* in which he describes his experiences with a patient who was involved with an hallucination about his helping to run a distant planetary world. He had their planetary life described down to the minutest detail—government, politics, military, social structures, everything. His task, he believed, was to help them survive and prosper—endlessly counseling and deciding major issues affecting the planet world. Lindner went along, not wanting to too early disturb the fantasy. Besides, it was all such a fantastic fantasy. And gradually a surprising thing happened. So intriguing were the particulars of the patient's fantasy, that almost without realizing it, Lindner got caught up in the fabrication. Finally in one session an engrossed Lindner excitedly joined the fantasy, adding his own suggestions about what was needed to deal with the planet's latest crisis. The session froze. The patient looked at him. It's not real, the patient said. And from that time he began letting it go and returning to reality. But what struck Lindner was how easily he—the therapist—had, unknowingly, been sucked into sharing the hallucination. Intense involvement with engrossing detail has a way of doing that. But it doesn't make it any less fantasy.³

(Barry Sander believes that one of the most destructive effects of television is that it has taken over the fantasizing function, thereby denying that practice to our television children. He believes that this is changing their basic consciousness. Perhaps this is just one more contribution to what I call our media-induced cyber consciousness mutation.)⁴

Anyway, as I consider Gebser, I keep recalling Lindner's experience. Gebser's ideas are so encompassing. So complete. It all fits. But reality is not that way. Our world is much more random, chaotic, contingent (as Stephen Jay Gould likes to point out).⁵ Of Gebser, I am skeptical.

Perhaps Gebser was too caught up in a mental-rational, late-modernity logic when he developed his closed system, with its vertical teleological, even eschatological, overtones.

There is something too final about Gebser's making integral consciousness the closure to his schema. This view is shared by Ken Wilber and Georg Feuerstein in the January 1997 issue of *Integrative Explorations* when Feuerstein writes "[Wilber] rightly, in my view, points out that evolution may not be over with the emergence of the integral structure and that it in all probability is 'merely a phase in an ever-greater unfolding'...

Gebser's scheme, which ends with the integral consciousness, leaves one with an uneasy sense of closure."⁶

So instead of Gebser's culminating integral consciousness, I wish to suggest that we may be seeing a more open-ended, horizontal emerging cyber consciousness.

Consider all that has happened since Gebser formed his theories. We have seen television and computer ubiquity, the Web/Internet, virtual communities and virtual identities, widespread use of consciousness-altering psychoactive drugs, the rise of the information society, a totally commodified media culture, AI and Deep Blue, and post-modernity challenging grand controlling narratives.

Marshall McLuhan was one of the first to recognize changes wrought by electronic technologies. Seeing all technologies as extensions of human faculties, he saw the media being our extended nervous system. Television was a tactile, not merely an audio-visual, experience. The medium was the message, and that message was change. So profound was this change, that McLuhan declared that the new television generations would be qualitatively different from the older print ones. They would have a different consciousness—less linear, more mosaic and all-at-oneness.

On the computer he said, "With the computer there has risen the possibility of extending consciousness itself as a technological environment. If this is done, it cannot be done on the basis of any existing notion of rationality."⁷

And again, "Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned. Rapidly, we approach the final phase of the extensions of man—the technological simulation of consciousness, when the creative process of knowing will be collectively and corporately extended to the whole of human society, much as we have already extended our sense and nerves by various media."⁸

And McLuhan once more, "I feel that we're standing on the threshold of a liberating and exhilarating world in which the human tribe can become truly one family and man's consciousness can be freed from the shackles of mechanical culture and enabled to roam the cosmos...the new man, linked in a cosmic harmony that transcends time and space."⁹

If the spirit of his words reminds us of Gebser, the methodology is definitely *Neuromancer*.

(However, consider my McLuhanesque probe citations as not so much final arbiters as suggestive potentials, each firmly contextualized in the flickering shadows of our time. Rereading McLuhan, I noticed how he baldly states "TV will not work as background. It engages you. You have to be *with* it."¹⁰ But with television's common usage today as background, we know how wrong he was, how limited he was to what he knew in his time.)

Other modern apostles of the cybercult similarly point to the possibility of an emerging cyber consciousness.

Howard Rheingold speaks of the Internet as more than a virtual community—as a place of true spiritual communion. And the resulting electronic community as having a "shared consciousness" as the experience of "group mind."¹¹

From his theorizing about speed, Paul Virilio envisions a major change in consciousness in which time becomes instantaneous, superseding the perspective of real space invented in Quattrocento. This is reminiscent of Gebser's ideas of the integral structure being aperspectival although typical of his sweeping grand theorizing Gebser sees the aperspectival as encompassing all time. Virilio more specifically sees his generalities as a result of developing technology rather than some more metaphysical force such as the Origin. Similarly, I think that a cyber consciousness would represent simply a change—a horizontal mutation—as opposed to the teleological inflection of Gebser's schema.¹²

Arthur Kroker gets carried away at times—most of the time perhaps—but going off in all directions does produce some hits. For Kroker, there is a new TV self—we have become screens. Technology is being interiorized, coming from within the self. It is inside, not outside. Kroker sees an increasing fusion of the electronic matrix with the human brain.¹³

This mix of human and machine is a common theme in both contemporary scholarship and popular science fiction, as well as increasingly in human experience. Consider only the cyborgs of our media such as the Bionic Woman, the Six Million Dollar Man, Robocop, and the Terminators. While Donna Haraway is the name most linked to the cyborg, discussing what is happening to the body in our age of prosthetic technology is very current in cultural studies. For Virilio, this decoration of the body comes from our immersion in cybermedia.

Gebser speaks of the integral in terms of a sense of wholeness, accompanied by a sense of time as intensity. A newly emerging cyber consciousness might be less concerned with integrality and wholeness than with dispersion and decenteredness.

With the integral, Gebser posits a transparency of all previous consciousness structures. Such a view certainly fits his metatheory. Nevertheless, I'd be more inclined to consider something which gave more consideration to today's brain/mind/consciousness models. This is a marvelous time to be studying consciousness and the mind. There is more activity today in these areas than there has been in ages. So in the flush of enthusiasm about these ideas, I'd like to wonder if the transparency of an emerging consciousness—if there is to be a transparency—might be more about the workings of our brain/mind(s).

Let's consider how such an awareness might operate with respect to just two such models. The connectionist perspective such as that of Marvin Minsky sees consciousness and the self not as a centered, authoritative ego so much as emerging from the actions of a society of subminds—agents that individually and locally operate on inputs. The result of this pattern and activity emerges as our consciousness.¹⁴

Daniel Dennett sees the self and consciousness as a mode of action resulting from many 'stories' which are being "told" inside our brain/minds, each doing part of the process. What emerges is the notion of the self as the center of this narrative gravity.¹⁵

If there is to be a transparency, I wonder if it might be more of a transparency of some of the now unconscious workings of Minsky's agents, or Dennett's narrating homunculi.

So then, let us hesitantly speculate what might constitute an emerging cyber consciousness.

Its sense of reality is of virtual realities, of what Baudrillard calls hyperreality.

For the self there are virtual identities inhabiting virtual communities. The social construction of the subject mutates into the virtual-subject-constructed virtual subject.

The human body melds and merges with the machinic body, the prosthetic constructions of the cyborg.

The human locus becomes media extended, our sense of presence in the media scape is ubiquitous.

Knowledge production exceeds our grasp and limitations in the instantaneity of the cyber.

This instantaneity pushes us into real time—where things happen *now*, as well as into cyber light speed—where things happen at speeds beyond our ken.

These times supersede space, which now becomes virtual space.

Gebser chose symbols and signs to represent his structures. Where he uses the point, circle, triangle and sphere, for cyber consciousness I'd suggest the screen, the matrix, the field, or the web.

To the place of Gebser's organ emphases on, respectively, the ear, mouth, and eye, I'd offer the McLuhanesque tactile sense.

Finally, one of Gebser's most striking images of the integral is the fourth dimension sense of Picasso's cubism. (Which is perhaps another example of Gebser's being tied to his time, since cubism had a relatively short existence as an artistic style).

Perhaps it's time for us to put down our Picasso and pick up our *Neuromancer*.

Endnotes

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- ³Lindner, R. (1955). *The Fifty Minute Hour*. NY: Rinehart.
- ⁴Heard on a television interview.
- ⁵This is a constant theme of his books. I recently heard him enunciate it on the PBS television program *The Glorious Accident* (10 June 1997).
- ⁶Feuerstein, G. (1997, January). Gebser's Archaic Consciousness and Wilber's Critique. *Integrative Explorations: Journal of Culture and Consciousness*, 4(1), PP 34-40. Quote from p. 38.
- ⁷McLuhan, E. and Zingrone, F. (eds.). (1995). *Essential McLuhan*. NY: Basic Books. P. 296. (Original quote from Marshall McLuhan, 1971.)
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- ⁹McLuhan, M. (1969, March). Interview in *Playboy*, pp. 53-74, 158. Quote from p. 158.
- ¹⁰McLuhan, M. *Understanding Media*. P. 312.
- ¹¹Robins, K. (1996). *Into the Image*. London & New York: Routledge. (Quoted material of Howard Rheingold from p. 98.)
- ¹²This material is generalized from various works by Paul Virilio, as was presented in a paper by myself and John Turner at the 1996 Jean Gebser conference.
- ¹³Summarized from various works by Kroker.
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On Communication Competence

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What is communication competence? Can it be reduced to variable analytics? The variable analytics of mainstream social science presumes that communication competence can be operationalized into measurable, hence, quantifiable, variables. Perhaps for pedagogical reasons, this method of (re)searching communication competence is very convenient. It reduces the difficulties and complexities of instruction and mentorship to the mechanized conveyance of information in the interest of massified education. However, does this process of variable analytics compromise the integrity of the phenomenon itself? Does variable analytic reductionism change the essential nature of communication competence?

Think of a competent communicator. It may be your favorite politician or the best professor you have ever studied under. It may be your favorite musician, or the artist who paints what no one else can capture on canvas. Now that you have a specific person in mind, make a list (mentally, not on paper) of all the knowledge and skills that this person had to acquire in order to be the competent communicator that you believe them to be. For example, think about the speech word-for-word, and the gestures and voice patterns. Think about each note they had to play, or each stroke they had to paint. If you were to write these things, give them to a beginner, and said “Do this verbatim.”, would they too be competent via automated reproduction of behavior. Of course not. There is much more to competence than just doing the right thing. itself would serve as a hindrance to competence, not a facilitator of it. For example, how could the notes of a song serve as a hindrance to being a competent musician?

In a scene from the movie *Mr. Holland’s Opus*, Mr. Holland (the music teacher, orchestra director, and composer) was tutoring a young clarinetist. Mr. Holland was puzzled because even though the teenager had played for several years and was excellent at reading notes, her sound bordered horrendous. He asked her, “Do you have fun playing the clarinet?” Confused that he would even ask such a question, she replied “No.” Finally, after a brief conversation about her childhood, he asked her to think of something about herself that she liked the most. She said that once her father told her that he loved her hair because it reminded him of the sunset.

Mr. Holland said to play the song again. She looked down at the notes and began to play. He immediately snatched the music book from the stand and said “...without the notes this time.” In shock, she asked what she was supposed to play if she did not have the notes. He gently encouraged her by saying that she had played the song a million times and knew the notes. This time . close your eyes and play the sunset.” In a moment of musical genius, he recognized that the notes had become a hindrance. After she played, it was

obviously the symphony. But, there was a marked difference in the sound - it was much more pleasing to the ear. She had learned the difference between playing notes and being a musician. Now, she was well on her way to becoming a competent clarinetist.

Variable analytics hypertropically foregrounds skills and knowledge in the speculative metaphysical interests of reductionism and empiricism. However, competence can only show itself in the forgetfulness of skills and knowledge. Therefore, any reduction of communication competence must be a phenomenological reduction (which brackets all presuppositions, except that of consciousness itself); not a psychologistic (which presumes the mind/body dualism), nor a physicalistic (which presumes the metaphysic of quantification) reduction. The an alternative view of communication competence after having bracketed the metaphysics assumed by variable analytics. It is an attempt to understand (or stand under), rather than explain (or stand over), communication competence.

Embodiment of Communication

When we observe someone who is extremely competent in communicating, communication is something that is natural for them. They know exactly what to do, when to do it, and how. This means that communication is not a separate entity, apart from them, that they are activating. Instead, the communication is a part of them - it is embodied.

Communication ceases to be a tool, separate from the self, and becomes an extension of the self. According to Merleau-Ponty (1964:62),

Language is by no means simply an instrument or a tool. For it belongs to the nature of the tool that we master its use, which is to say we take it in hand and lay it aside when it has done its service. That is not the same as when we take the words of a language, lying ready in the mouth, and with their use let them sink back into the general store of words over which we dispose. Such an analogy is false because we never find ourselves as consciousness over against the world and, as it were, grasp after a tool of understanding in a wordless condition. Rather, in all our knowledge of ourselves and in all knowledge of the world, we are always already encompassed by the language which is our own.

Thus, language is not something that the competent communicator merely uses. Instead, the competent communicator exists in and through the communication. Communication becomes “the medium in and through which we exist and perceive our world” (Gadamer, 1976:29).

To embody communication is to see the self and the communicative act as coexisting. The self becomes manifest and concretized as being through communication. This is how communication is recognized as being embodied. However, what exactly is it that is embodied in the competent communicator—i.e., what is the nature of the communication which is embodied?

According to Gadamer (1976: 63), “Learning to speak does not mean learning to use a preexistent tool for designating a world already somehow familiar to us; it means acquiring a world with the world itself and how it confronts us.” Merleau-Ponty (1973:50) advocated a similar idea by saying, “... to learn to speak is to coexist more and more with the environment.”

We must be careful of the implications of these ideas. The world itself is not reducible to communication or language. There is a spatio-temporal world of objects (duration, in a Kantian sense) that exists regardless of how, or whether or not we communicate about it. However, insofar as humans are essentially communicative beings, we communicate about this world of objects. Therefore, these objects (and any object available to our consciousness) can only exist in the particular way that they do exist for us in and through our communication about them. As such, the world is essentially communicative. Gadamer (1989:384-385, 443, 457) called this linguisticality. Language is not identical with the spatio-temporal world, but it becomes infinitely close to the things it names (Gadamer, 1976:35; 1989:401) “In all our knowledge of ourselves and in all knowledge of the world, we are always already encompassed by the language that is our own” (Gadamer, 1976:62).

Language cannot be solely reducible to a system of symbols which is governed by rules of syntactical, semantical, and phonological natures as linguists would have us believe (Orth, 1973). On the contrary, language is a mode of being in the world, or in a situation. As such, the competent communicator does not provide us with a series of symbols that we must decode. Instead, the competent communicator reveals the world to us as already meaningful. The communication does not represent meaning; it, itself, is “the physical embodiment and expression of meaning which is inseparable from its bodily expression --[it] signifies itself. It is the physical appearance of meaning” (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: xiv). Communication Competence in this sense, is not being able to use language well; it is the presentation (Gebser, 1985) of world through communication. Competent communication is “singing the world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: xv), not representing it.

Merleau-Ponty (1968:8, 9) further elaborated on the embodiment of communication by discussing the intertwining nature of the body and speech. The body is what enables the self to sense the world—eyes allow us to see, ears to hear, nose to smell, et cetera. “Thus, the relationship between the things [that I perceive through my senses] and my body is decidedly singular.” In a similar sense, it is communication which allows us to share the world (someone else sees, hears, smells, etc.). In addition, he said

Like the flesh of the visible, speech is a total part of the significations, like it, speech is a relation to Being through a being, and like it, it is narcissistic, eroticized, endowed with a natural magic that attracts the other significations into its web, as the body feels the world in feeling itself.. As the

world is behind my body, the operative essence is behind the operative speech also... (1968:118)

We know that others can feel the same things that we can feel because we see the visible body that we all have in common. For example, I know that others can feel pain if they are hit hard enough, because I too can feel pain when hit hard enough. As such, I also intuit that speaking is a revelation of the world-as-apperceived through their bodily senses. This is because I know that when I speak, it comes from my body, thus, making it a revelation of the world-as-apperceived through my bodily senses. Thus, the intersubjective nature of communication is perception's salvation from solipsism, giving perception its possibilities of apperception through communication.

This is a necessary premise for communication competence. To recognize someone's competence, there must be intersubjectivity. I must be able to place myself in their position in order to understand the significance of what is happening. For example, to recognize a basketball player that is competent at playing basketball, I must know the rules of the game. I have to know what is allowed and not allowed. I also have to have another basketball player with which to compare this one, possibly myself or even a hypothetical case, but at least a standard for comparison. This is what allows me to recognize and appreciate the oneness (i.e., the embodied nature of basketball) that a competent player reveals when playing basketball. We do not see an individual who is playing the game. It is a person who is at one with the game; the basketball court becomes the home in which their being resides. They appear comfortable, relaxed, effortless, natural. However, I can appreciate this because I know that it is not easy, and effortless, and natural; but, that it took hard work and hours of practice. This understanding is based on intersubjectivity. The same is true for communication. I intersubjectively understand that it is not easy to be at one with what is being communicated. It takes a special quality for someone to be extremely communicatively competent.

The embodiment of communication is an essential feature of communication competence. Communication is not seen as an activity that one does. Instead, it is the very mode of being the one who is communicatively competent. There is no separation between the communicatively competent person and their communication. They both merge together in the temporal flow of the interaction. The only way to become aware of this is by intersubjectively coexisting in the situation. This intersubjectivity implicates another essential feature of communication competence - the vital connection of self and other.

Vital Connection of Self and Other

With the interconnectedness of the self and other, the premise of intersubjectivity which grounded an understanding for recognizing competence, now begins to unfold into a different dimension. In this

dimension, intersubjectivity as an “I” and “you” vanish at the point of a magical awareness of the interaction in which the “I” and “you” become inseparable.

According to Gadamer (1976:65),

A second essential feature of the being of language seems to me to be its I-lessness. Whoever speaks a language that no one else understands does not speak. To speak means to speak to someone. The word should be the right word. That, however, does not mean simply that it represents the intended object for me, but rather, that it places eyes of the other person to whom I speak... To that extent, speaking does not belong in the sphere of the “I” but in the sphere of the “We”

This is what is happening when all of those who are involved in the interaction or witness the interaction become completely encaptured. The speaker, of communication all become consolidated into one-ness in submission to the text of communication itself. For example, there are times when professors may be completely encaptured with the lecture. It seems like everything is going great, the words are just coming naturally, and everyone’s attention is magically riveted in submission to the interaction. The audience is in awe. They have become wrapped up in the communicative event. At this moment, there is no distinction between the self and others, the professor and the students, the speaker and audience, person to person, et cetera. Through the text, they all co-relate to one another as one.

Gadamer (1976:17) said, “Genuine speaking, which has something to say and hence does not give prearranged signals, but rather seeks words through which one reaches the other person...” Thus, at every moment in the communicative interaction, the speaker (or author) considers the audience (or reader). The expression of the communication and the understanding of it become one in the same. The audience is constantly considering what the speaker is intending by what is being said. Intentionality and consequentiality become one in the same, thereby rendering each irrelevant for the moment. This combined involvement of both parties becomes apparent in the continual dissolution of boundaries which demarcate the space between positions. Each party becomes both “positions” simultaneously. To “be in” both “positions” simultaneously makes the distinction inconsequential. Logically speaking to hold both “positions” is to hold no “position”. Positionality and rigidified boundaries fade as all is in flux. Instead of an “I” and a “you” communicating to one another from each respective position, it becomes a “we” caught up in the communicative phenomenon.

Merleau-Ponty (1968:11, 13) discussed the we-ness of communication by declaring the following in regards to the private worlds of communication,

... how could I conceive, precisely as his, his colors, his pain, his world, except as in accordance with the colors I see, the pains I have had, the world wherein I live? But at least my private world has ceased to be mine only; it is

now the instrument which another plays, the dimension of a generalized life which is grafted onto my own ... It is therefore indeed true that the 'private worlds' communicate, that each of them is given to its incumbent as a variant of one common world. The communication makes us the witnesses of one sole world, as the synergy of our eyes suspends them on one unique thing.

... it is the same world that contains our bodies and our minds ... which connects our perspectives, permits transition from one to the other ... and which makes us feel we are two witnesses capable of hovering over the same true object or at least of exchanging our situations relative to it, as we can exchange our standpoints in the visible world in the strict sense.

The world in which communication occurs is essentially shared. There is always a "we-ness" in communication. This is also demonstrated in other works: such as, Goffman's *Interaction Ritual*, and Hall's (1976) concept of synchrony and syncing. However, these works reduce the shared nature of communication to a behavioral level. This is very limited. Behaviorism necessarily reduces syncing to two subjective parties who coordinate movements with one another. However, there is no other in syncing. The other is already presumed immanent within the self. Thus, synchronicity is always given, or made immediate, at the level of transcendental constitutionality which goes beyond contingent (behavioral) cases, and into the essential realm of the phenomenon itself. This is the level at which Gadamer and Merleau-Ponty attempt to articulate—the level of apodictic experience—while behaviorism remains contingent.

Thus far, it has been advocated that communication competence entails the embodiment of communication which is coexistent with a vital connection of the self and other which becomes a "we-ness." Essentially, at this point, there is a unity of the topic, the speaker/author, and audience/listener/reader. All are in perfect unison as they are concretized through the text. None could exist without the others. As there is a vital connection, the two always jointly submit to the communication itself. The we-ness becomes a continually unfolding dimension of submission to the communicative act itself in our consciousness of communication competence.

Joint Submission to Communication

Gadamer (1976) used the analogy of a game to describe the dynamics of communication. The game is characterized by movement which is not the consequence of subjective attitudes. Instead, it is the obeying of the rules of the game that allows one to become competent. In this sense, there is a transcendental attitude that guides that of the subjective entities involved in the game. As such, every one's movement directly corresponds to the movement of everyone else's. It appears that one knows the movement of the others' at the exact time that it happens - almost as though they anticipate the movement. In a sense, they are in more than one place at the same time -

they are in the “self” and in the “others” simultaneously. The movement of the other is im-mediate as the movement of the self. All movement becomes an “our”. This perfectly orchestrated coordination of movement is made possible in and through the submission to the game.

This complete submission allows freedom within the boundaries of the game. As one completely possesses the game (by their submission to it with the others), they simultaneously become possessed by the game. This completeness of being in the game allows for freedom to exist in and through the game because action is able to spring forth in a “self-forgetfulness”. It is not lack of self-control, but rather, the freedom to exist completely in and through the game itself. Playing the game becomes being the game. Gadamer (1976:54) summarized the game by saying that “We can formulate this idea as a theoretical generalization by saying that the individual self, including his activity and his understanding of himself, is taken up into a higher determination that is the really decisive factor.”

This also describes what we observe in someone who is extremely competent in communicating. It is obvious that they have mastered the skill; however, there is also a sense in which the skill has mastered them (Gadamer, 1976:87). Their speaking is so free flowing and natural that it is as if they are being lead by the act itself. It is not that they are searching for the right words, trying to do the right thing in the appropriate way. Instead, there is apparent effortlessness - as though they are being guided by the communication. To know the exact right thing to say, in the exact right way, within a certain context, at the exact right time, is a lot to be able to do. However, the competent communicator makes it appear easy because all of these dimensions have collapsed into the simplicity of one-ness in which the communicators submit themselves in self-forgetfulness through the playing of communication.

It has been advocated that when we are awaring communication competence, we are awaring the embodiment of communication as it is manifest in the communicative act. Intersubjectivity, which is required for this awareness, continually unfolds into the we-ness of communication. As such, the we-ness is made concrete in the joint submission to communication. Here, all dimensions of competent communication are acknowledged as a one-ness. There is complete unity among the speaker/author, the text/message, and the listener/reader. This unity is observed in our consciousness of—of communication competence.

Conclusion

By bracketing the metaphysical assumptions commonly used to explain communication competence in mainstream social scientific literature, we have been able to articulate some essential features of communication competence. In our consciousness of.. communication competence, there is the

embodied nature of communication. The communication is a natural part of the competent communicator. Communication becomes an extension of self.

The embodiment of communication presupposes intersubjectivity. In order to recognize a competent communicator, I must be able to stand in their place and intuit the difficulty of what they are doing. This enables me to see the embodiment through the possibilities of disembodiment - or lesser degrees of embodiment.

This intersubjectivity, which provides the pre-condition for recognizing embodiment, then unfolds into a different dimension of communication competence. This dimension is the we-ness of communication. The "I" and "you" of intersubjectivity fade into oblivion through the continual fluxing of author and reader, speaker and listener. The "other" is always already presupposed in recognition of self. The one constantly considers the other, rendering the distinction void.

The unity of the "self" and "other" (or author and reader, speaker and listener) necessitates an awareness of timelessness and spacelessness as in magical consciousness (Gebser, 1985). This magical awareness is concretized in the joint submission of all to the interaction itself. In this instant, all become part of a transcendental force that guides the interaction. Through this joint submission, there arises the freedom to completely exist within the interaction. The competent communicator expresses the wholeness of their being through the communication.

Perhaps a good way to illustrate the difference between this understanding of communication competence and a variable analytic explanation of it (as is commonly seen in mainstream emphases on skills, knowledge, et cetera) is to provide an analogy. Communication is to the competent communicator as musical notes are to the competent musician. Imagine a beginner playing the song. They struggle from one note to the next in a desperate attempt to hit each note accurately, just as they have been taught. They constantly look at the sheet, then back to their hands, then to the appropriate key. The overall picture is very disjointed. The song is not quite a song; it is merely a series of notes that have been strung together. It is the person is just beginning. They are learning the mastery of the skill which takes hours of practice and dedication.

On the other hand, what happens after hours of practice and dedication? There is a fluidity of action. The hand movements are all perfectly coordinated. It looks as though the hands themselves anticipate where to go next, as if they are already there. When they look at the sheet, if they even need to, they do not see musical notes; they hear sounds. But not isolated sounds; each sound is blended with the next sound and the one before it. It is now music through notes. In the peak of competence, the song may never be played the same way again because each time it is played, in submission to the act of playing, the song itself takes on a new life. The audience is in

complete awe. They feel the passions of the musician as they are concretized in and flowing through the music itself. All are encaptured by the performance. It is no longer a performance. For the encaptured, it is being. Have they mastered the song, or has the song mastered them? The inability to distinguish, the indeterminacy, is where competence lies.

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Education in Latin America: Overlapping Structures of Consciousness

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Introduction

There have been many attempts to understand and articulate the historical phenomena in Latin America. Despite their differences, those approaches have emphasized three common ideas. First, all phenomena must be rationalized and arranged in a continuous historical process, which is supposed to end with a desired emancipation. Second, the independence and the articulation of the national states have to be the foundation of a common identity. Third, the sovereign states should be inserted into the trend toward progress through a process of modernization and by the acceptance of the universal validity of scientific reason. This commonality among different theoretical and practical approaches not only constitute a rationale of understanding historical phenomena, but also a structure which shapes the legitimate way the world is perceived, knowledge is constructed, identity is constituted, power is articulated, rules of speaking and writing are posited, and even silence is interpreted.

In Gebser's logic, we may think that Latin America mutated from a mythical and unaperspectival structure of awareness to a rational and perspectival one. Accordingly, we could say that Latin America reached equilibrium by the very shifting from one to another structure of consciousness. At least, it could be interpreted that finally a historical solution of the crisis caused by the collision between the native people of this continent and the European conqueror has been attained. The magic of Aztecs, Mayans, and Incas was defeated by the new magic of the technological and modern era, and the egoless (the "we" tribal oriented) and irrational (magical) trace evolved to the egocentric and rationally oriented one.

However, this particular phenomenon of clashing among structures of awareness is still present. Indeed, since the nineteenth century Latin America has been characterized by the attempt at becoming part of the "Western culture." The practical implications of this were the emergence in Latin America of an obsessive desire for constituting a mental structure (culture) at all costs. This constitution of the modern perspectival awareness as a way of approaching the world was regarded as a priority. This way, all the social institutions created or recreated by national states tried to magnify the mental structure of consciousness. Another aspect of this project has been the deliberate unfolding of a design, which would abolish the appearance of other structures of the consciousness, particularly the mythical for being considered as primitive and an obstacle to the progressive development of the region. Thus, this logic has been equivalent not only to a deliberate policy of assimilation and acculturation, but also to

a brutal and violent form meant to suppress all that challenged and resisted this instrumental (rational) way of dealing with the world. Any action of resistance or even the appearance of different forms of understanding were condemned to be repressed, enslaved, or eliminated. A recent example of the latter is the recent events in Chiapas, Mexico. The Mexican army immediately and violently acted against the Indigenous movement of resistance, arguing that they were reestablishing the order of law. The establishment could not accept that the Indigenous people intended to organize themselves in order to acquire the most basic conditions of life. This very fact was regarded as a direct action against the Mexican Constitution and all the Western values such as sovereignty, liberty, and equality.

There are manifold cases that we could mention from all across Latin American. This is to say that the realization of the mental structure, or more precisely, the awakening of the rational or perspectival consciousness in Latin American, resulted in a systematic process of suppression and destruction of other horizons and ways of understanding the world for the sake of constructing a homogenous (rational) structure of consciousness regarded as universal, superior, or global.

Within this context, one of the most important institutions which has functioned for constituting the mental structure has been the school. No doubt, formal education has been arranged in such a way that one of its essential functions is the creation of national identities through a process of homogenization (Ossenbach, 1993). This is to say that the search for a unique identity after the colonial period in Latin America concluded in the acceptance of a common design that overestimated those abilities and skills demanded by a global development of capitalism. Education was conceived as a tool for the elimination of cultural differences as Emile Durkheim (1975) pointed out: "Society can survive only if there exists among its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity, education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child, from the beginning, the essential similarities that collective life demands." (p. 70)

No doubt, education has been articulated as the primary means to unfold a modern consciousness portrayed by the political and scientific enlightenment. Unfortunately, the very claim of the universal legitimacy and validity of the mental consciousness structure of the modern West in the schools has obliterated the issue of human differences. In Latin America, however, this universalizing project of modern education has created a cultural crisis, which is expressed by not recognizing different modes of awareness. The result has been the creation of a twofold structure of consciousness which manifests its predominance in accordance with the setting in which a person or group of people is interacting. In schools, courts, hospitals, or other private or public institutions, the mental structure is manifested. On the other hand, the mythical structure is

predominant at home, in the neighborhood when the shaman, the midwife, the sorcerer, or the elder is present. This peculiar overlapping creates a manifest, and sometimes a latent conflict. This is to say that there is a systematic process of fragmentation of the consciousness structure of children. The fragmentation occurs in the context of the clashing of Indigenous and Western cultures and as a continuation, or even a new version, of the collision of the magical, mythical, and unperspectival culture of the native people in Latin America with the rational, technological, perspectival attitude of the Western societies. After all, as Gebser (1991) stated:

There are surely enough historical instances of the catastrophic downfall of entire peoples and cultures. Such declines were triggered by the collision of deficient and exhausted attitudes that were insufficient for continuance with those more recent, more intense, and, in some respects, superior. (p. 5)

However, the character of this problematic questions not only the legitimate interpretation of the collision among different manifestations of human approaches to the world, but also the very understanding from which one attempts to articulate, hierarchize, and judge different structures of human consciousness. In fact, Gebser's articulation of cultural awareness and consciousness already presupposes a Western, modern rationality from which other non-Western cultures are interpreted.

In this sense, the historical construction of different (rational) cultural, symbolic designs might not be appropriate for other cultures, such as those native groups in Latin America. This is to say that both theoretically and methodologically one faces a difficulty to describe and understand the interrelationship among different cultures and different forms in which human consciousness is manifested.

This article shows different aspects of this problematic by describing how formal and informal educational institutions are constituting a twofold structure of consciousness. In addition, this paper demonstrates how this situation is leading to a constant collision between these two predominant structures of consciousness in Latin America by showing the multiplicity and multi-layered composition of human and cultural interrelationships.

Methodologically speaking, this paper must also be critically aware of several concepts such as the notion of mutation, which has been misinterpreted as being commensurable with the notion of progressive evolution. In fact, the very notion of progressive evolution already assumes a historical construction that favors all that is new. The process of mutation, for example, cannot be regarded necessarily as a continuous process; instead it can be accessed as a discontinuous unfolding of the consciousness that in several cases is given in leaps. This means, generally, we must hold in abeyance any previous judgment or preconceived articulation of the structures of consciousness.

Education and the Twofold Structure of Consciousness

Having achieved independence from Spain, the Latin American oligarchy embraced the ideals of scientific enlightenment for building a modern, independent, and sovereign nation. The postcolonial project in Latin America consisted of the effort to achieve progress and to join the universal development of history. The political discourse was concerned with trying to rationalize and arrange all socio-economic phenomena in a continuous historical process which was supposed to achieve in every moment a desired project of humanity based on scientific and technological reason. In fact, the political project of building a modern nation was based on the acceptance of Western universal claims in favor of progress and development that required the establishment of new functions assigned to education for civilizing and homogenizing people. In short, education was seen as the process of articulating the perspectival (rational) structure of consciousness.

Thus, the Latin American postcolonial consciousness posits a double standard in relation to Europe. On the one hand, Latin Americans must be proud and grateful for their independence from Spain. On the other hand, there was a recognition that the construction of a modern nation necessitated the submission to those universal ideals posited by Europeans. This was the political paradox of postcolonialism: to achieve freedom meant to become submitted over and over to Western culture. And this new submission demanded the institutionalization and universalization of schooling as one of the most important policies of the modern Latin American States. This also meant a new rational and technical awareness which suppressed all other forms of perceiving the world. In this way, after colonialism, several attempts were made to articulate the Latin American educational system as one based on the Western, modern life-world. Educational laws were already articulated within the logic of a modern Western life-world which considered schooling, or formal education, as the most important way of arranging educational institutions in Latin America.

However, underlying the educational legislation was a broader horizon, which regarded other forms of education as non-systematic and, therefore, less valuable than the education received at school. In fact, schooling became the legitimate way of arranging educational experiences. This meant that the awareness that reduced the scope of education to formal education constituted a sedimented perception that was grounded in scientific and technical discourses. The very conditions established for considering educational practices as modern requires that the educational practices should be scientifically founded in order to establish the “rational structure of consciousness” as the common ground among the population.

The practical consequences consisted on an expansion of schools all around Latin America, particularly in urban areas, and the modification of the process of arranging the phenomena of education (curricula and

educational experiences). Thus, schools were conceived as one of the principal institutions to transmit the scientific knowledge rather than other cultural practices and traditions. According to the new rationale, the same process of education must be constructed following scientific and technological processes. In 1876, there was a Latin American Conference of Education which declared that schools should introduce the natural sciences and they must be the core of the curriculum with Spanish and Math. In the same conference, the participants stated that pedagogy should evolve to a new stage called the age of science and technology in the field of education (Gonzalez, 1970).

The practical domain of this new scientific pedagogy has sustained three main premises: a) to understand learning as changes produced in human behaviors which can be observable by empirical means and controlled by the arrangement of the environment; b) to introduce statistical and mathematical techniques to measure different educational phenomena; and c) to specify and create the type of behaviors required to create a new society. The practical domain of this scientific education made schools factories which produced desirable human beings based on technical tools provided by sciences such as psychology. Thus, this scientific and technological perspective of education was articulated as the magic expression (the power to make) of the mental structure of consciousness. In this sense, educators have been more concerned with methodologies, techniques or means rather than discussing the goals of education and the legitimate conditions for their pursuit in a context of cultural diversity. Thus, the latter exhibits how instrumental reason pervaded the educational institutions, discourses, and practices.

The instrumental perspective has tried to reduce and explain all educational phenomena based on this rational mode of awareness. It was demanded of teachers that they master how to calculate normal curves, standard deviations, coefficients of correlation, regression equations, and other statistical tests, and by using these statistical methods they determined the status of school practices. Essentially, they directed, scientifically, the course of education's development. Because of the quest for quantities and measurements, educational rationality demanded an essential adjustment in the conception of its phenomena. This is to say, the totality of human aspects and facets are reduced to measurable elements. Education had defined the kind of change it wanted to produce in human beings—changes empirically observed, but also measured according to degree or amount. Therefore, to measure an educational product signified that teachers had to define the amount of measured change which indicated that a student knew something.

One example is a plan written by a teacher:

Given an object 1 to 12 inches long and a ruler, the student will measure the object and determine the relative error of measurement using the formula for relative error with at least 80% accuracy.

Given a selected topic, the student will write a five sentence paragraph with clearly stated topic sentence, supporting sentences, and concluding sentence with at least 90% accuracy.

Students will construct an electromagnet.

Students will provide the position and name of their administrative authorities the national state, and local levels of government.

Thus, education is exclusively reduced to those activities carried out in formal schools and organized upon the basis of the magical power of the mental structure. People who did not go to a formal school were considered uneducated, as has been the case of Indigenous peoples or peasants in Latin America.

This rational perspective in education does not recognize that human beings are not limited to reacting to stimuli, rather human beings in their relationship with the world signify the world. Moreover, the alleged mathematical and empirical basis of modern education cannot encompass nor understand the complexity of education, particularly if we consider that education is basically a living process of reaching a sense of life. This observation leads to the recognition of different conceptions of education. Zapotecas, Quiches, Guaranies, or Quechuas have their own process of education, whether it is an expression of the mythical consciousness, which even now is transmitted from the older generation to the younger one.

Nevertheless, the logic of the technical and instrumental mode of awareness is not able to accept other manifestations or perspectives of educational phenomena. In fact, the way Indigenous peoples and peasants transmit their customs and their understanding of the world cannot be grasped or even recognized by the science of education. With the rational perspective of behavioral changes and measurement, the very essence of Indigenous education, which is transmitted through the elders and shamans, vanishes. The rituals, gods, myths, symbols, and their structure of constituency are misunderstood and judged as primitive and decadent cultural manifestations which must be taken away.

Indeed, the science of education is incapable of understanding and describing these manifestations which constitute not only a pregiven field that is required to be considered as one form of pedagogical constituency, but also a fundamental part of the phenomena of education. After all, education is a process of reflecting about the immediacy of our lives and giving sense to the everyday life, and those cultural practices give sense and meaning to Indigenous lives and their world.

Indeed, the intention of giving emphasis to this instrumental and technological rationality has been strongly supported in the field by

expanding schools in Latin America and by making the enrollment in formal education obligatory. All these efforts have contributed to articulating a twofold structure of consciousness. On the one hand, children are able to master and to develop a set of skills demanded by the instrumental rationality. This is to say, children become competent in applying the scientific process efficiently and in using technology. They are expected to be objective, as proposed by the natural sciences in order to explain the problems they face. And they must detach each problem from their life–world. In addition, the skills developed in schools are evaluated by teachers to be sure they perform according to what was expected.

The rational structure of consciousness is present and emphasized when children are in schools. Once they go home, children leave the mental awareness and recover their mythical structure. They remember what shamans have been teaching about medicine, magic, witchcraft, and divination. Mayan children remember what they observed from farmers, and how time is related to life when they learned to divide time in 13 months of 20 days each. These ways of structuring the consciousness are different from the technological ways of awareness of Western society. However, in the view of scientism there is no possibility of other responses to those pre–established techniques recommended by the instrumental mode of awareness.

This situation seems to suggest a new collision between these two structures of consciousness. Indigenous peoples and peasants, whose mythical structure of consciousness has not been recognized in schools and in other social institutions, have decided to challenge and confront those who have been promoting modernity and technological rationality. Indigenous peoples and peasants are working to develop schools, which promote the mythical consciousness. Despite the legitimacy of this struggle, the very fragmentation of consciousness has forced Indigenous peoples and peasants to use the same strategies and technical devices as those utilized by the magical expression of the mental–rational structure. They are ready to maintain and enhance their mythical “rationality” in their neighborhoods and villages. Indigenous peoples and peasants want to universalize their way of experiencing the world, as it is expressed in their proposals for creating new schools that include mythic ways of knowing.

At this point several questions came up. Is this situation a reinvention of the collision between Aztecs and Spanish? Or is it the revenge of the mythical over the mental–rational structure? Is this particular overlapping of structures of consciousness a clash between structures or does it reveal a particular mutation (some sort of new “synthesis”) among the structures described by Gebser? Whatever answers we may suggest, the invariant is to find a way through which those structures can co–exist as an integral expression of individuals and cultures.

Dialogue: A Way of Articulating an Integral Structure of Consciousness

The phenomenon of education is primarily related to techniques or methods given in connection with the lived world and cultural traditions; education is related to symbolic systems in which people understand their actions and their relationships with others. In this sense, education detached from life–world, or the human experiences and their interconnections, is empty of sense. Only a dialogical, process education can articulate a poly–centeric way of signifying the world, and open the possibility of different modes of awareness of the educational phenomena as legitimate. As Landgrebe (1984) pointed out about the problem of life–world:

Natural life is a ‘life of interests’, interested in its specific goals and guided by considerations of the manner in which the things of this world can serve or hinder its projects. It knows that others have other projects and goals which under certain circumstances can collide with its own, and it knows that the others act according to other intentions which may be unknown or unintelligible to it: ‘That is beyond my horizon’. It thus knows that it has its own limited perspectives on the world, whose limits can, however be changed and broadened by communication and learning. (p. 185)

Therefore, the very existence of individual and cultural differences in the way we perceive, understand, and interplay with the world, open up the possibility of a dialogical education. In this sense, education refers to the continuous process of learning and constructing the world through mutual sharing of perspectives among people who belong to diverse cultures or among people who experience a mode of awareness. Students, teachers, and other members of the community participate in a dialogue in which they express their natural and/or theoretical attitude toward the world, which is considered as given. Then they ask questions, give answers, discuss, negotiate, and propound educational solutions to the problems and needs of the society and nature by means of mutual understanding or by means of admitting differences. Therefore, through dialogue it is possible to be aware and to reflect about our own structure of consciousness as well as, the structure of consciousness of the other.

In fact, schools can be an open space of dialogue in which children and people from different cultures come to share the way they articulate the world of particular phenomena. Education, then, is a process of giving and taking multiple perspectives of constituting the world. This is to say that we are not dealing with a static entity, rather we are dealing with a phenomena in mutation which integrates all different structures. Maybe, this cultural crisis, the clash of mental–rational and mythical can bring an opportunity to unfold the integral structure of consciousness and open up the field of education to a broader horizon able to incorporate different manifestations of being–in–the–world.

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